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Authors:  Joel Johansson and Jesper Olvebrink 
Advisor:  Lars Oxelheim 
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Purpose:  The purpose of this report is to examine the presence of 
CEO overconfidence in Sweden, and how monitoring 
of the board of directors affects the overconfidence in 
CEOs in Sweden.. 
Methodology:  Two proxies were used to measure overconfidence: 
OC1 which measured CEO insider trading, and OC2 
which measured CEO portrayal in media. A 
multivariate regression using the ordinary least squares 
method was performed on the data sample. 
Theoretical perspectives:  This study is influenced by previous published articles 
related to CEO overconfidence and the board of 
directors’ role as a monitoring organ. These articles 
include the works of Malmendier & Tate, Doukas & 
Petmezas, Brown & Sarma and several others. 
Empirical foundation:  A main sample consisting of 375 overconfident 
acquisitions was constructed from all acquisitions 
performed by Swedish companies during the time 
period 2000 to 2007. From this a sub sample was 
created of which 86 CEOs displaying overconfidence 
from at least one of the two proxies.  
Conclusions:  This study shows that outside directors have a very 
effective mean of curtailing observed overconfidence in 
CEOs. The variables for the CEOs- and employee 
representatives’ presence on the board of directors was 
found to be statistically insignificant and with a low 
effect on observed CEO overconfidence. 
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1. Introduction 
This study research the value destroying effect of overconfidence in mergers and 
acquisitions, and measures one can take to moderate the effect. This section presents a 
short introduction to the subject matter, followed by a positioning where we present  
our contribution to the field of overconfidence. The scope of this report, as well as the 
disposition, is also found in this section. 1.1 Introduction 
During the period of 1980-2001 large companies destroyed $226 billion in shareholder 
value through acquisition activities in USA alone1. Still, mergers and acquisitions is a 
common investment method for companies. One explanation which can help explain 
this seemingly irrational behavior is overconfidence. Indeed, research has shown that 
management overconfidence is a prevalent issue in mergers & acquisitions2,3,4. This 
means that when managers are deciding on an acquisition or merger it often stems from 
possible overconfidence in themselves and the belief that they can create value for the 
company from the acquisition in the form of synergies or their ability to improve the 
business. This leads them to believe they can pay higher price premiums than is 
realistic, which in turn will destroy shareholder value.  
Published articles states that managers’ overconfidence increase the probability that 
managers will conduct a merger, and that overconfident managers are more likely to 
conduct an acquisition that will not create value5. Their overconfidence result in an 
overvaluation of the cash flow increase and synergy benefits in the company they are 
about to acquire, and therefore they are ready to pay an unduly high price premium. If 
managers then are unable to realize additional value-creating goals from merging the 
companies, this would result in a destruction of value.  
                                                 
1 The National Bureau of Economic Research, Big firms lose value in acquisitions, Retrieved 2013-05-08, 
<http://www.nber.org/digest/aug03/w9523.html> 
2Malmendier, U & Tate, G., ‘Who makes Acquisitions? CEO Overconfidence and the Market’s 
Reaction’, Journal of Financial Economics, Issue 89, 2007. 
3Kaplan, S., Mitchell, M. & Wruck, K., A Clinical Exploration of Value Creation and Destruction in 
Acquisitions: Organizational Design, Incentives, and Internal Capital Markets, Chicago, National Bureau 
of Economic Research, 2000. 
4Doukas, J. & Petmezas, D.,‘Acquisitions, Overconfident Managers and Self-attribution Bias’, European 
Financial Management, vol. 13, no. 3, 2007, p. 531-577. 
5Malmendier, U & Tate, G., 2007, p. 20. 
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Overconfidence as an underlying factor in mergers and acquisitions is in other words 
empirically proven. This paper will add to the field by researching methods and factors 
which can moderate this factor.  1.2 Positioning 
The concept of overconfidence, previously largely a psychological concept, was 
introduced by Richard Roll in 1986 in his paper on the Hubris Hypothesis to the realm 
of economics. However, this paper was largely deductive, providing an alternative 
interpretation on data from a previous study by Jensen & Ruback (1983), in explaining 
the financial results of 40 previous papers. No quantifiable method to measure hubris 
was provided, and the theory was as yet unproven. 
The quantifiable effect of overconfidence in mergers and acquisition has since then 
been empirically proven in studies such as Malmendier & Tate (2007) and Doukas & 
Petmezas (2007), who found different, but similar, methods to estimate overconfidence 
using option theory or insider trading activities to measure CEO estimations of future 
company growth. 
However, these studies did little to explain the underlying motivators for 
overconfidence, focusing rather on characteristics of the behavior of the overconfident 
CEO. While the authors provide a statistically significant method of measuring 
overconfidence, they do not delve much further into the determinants that affect the 
result. However, other authors have tried identifying variables affecting the level of 
confidence. One such paper was published by Brown & Sarma in 2007, adding the 
“CEO Dominance” dimension, which gauges whether high CEO ownership stake in the 
firm has an effect on the levels of overconfidence. Still, research properly describing 
factors which will affect the level of overconfidence is still lacking, or in factors which 
would curtail overconfidence.  
Furthermore, much of the current research is performed on quite homogenous data 
samples, as they are collected from Anglo-Saxon companies, meaning USA, U.K. and 
Australia. These countries have similar social systems and corporate governance, which 
calls to question whether managerial overconfidence can be taken as a universal concept 
afflicting businesses regardless of geographical location, or whether it is a symptom of 
certain corporate structures.  
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This study instead uses a Swedish sample, which will allow for comparison between the 
Scandinavian control structure and regulation, and the previously studied Anglo-Saxon 
systems. One notable difference is the composition of the board of directors, where the 
Anglo-Saxon model uses a one tier model with the CEO almost always having a 
directors’ seat, and often CEO and President dual titles. Furthermore, this system has a 
relatively high number of insider directors. Sweden instead utilizes a two tier system, 
with the board of directors acting as a supervisory board, consisting of higher number of 
outsiders, and the CEO presence being notably lower. Furthermore, labor unions have a 
very strong presence in Sweden. Previous research has found strong indication of a 
relation between board composition and overconfidence. These differences, which can 
be measured in a Swedish sample, are the motivation in choosing three factors of board 
composition, and they are outsiders on the board of directors, CEO presence on the 
board of directors, and employee representatives on the board of directors.  
During the studied time period the board of directors in American firms consists on 
average 79 % of “independent outsiders” depending on the industry 6 . Meanwhile, 
Swedish boards consist of a larger percentage of external outsider directors, and may 
also include union representatives, as this study proves. Our study will discern whether 
these differences will have an impact on the level of overconfidence. 
This paper will largely be based on the methodology of prior research, mainly Doukas 
& Petmezas, but will also utilize models and compare results with recently published 
papers written by Malmendier & Tate, Brown & Sarma, Fama & Jensen and Hayward 
& Hambrick, who all contributed to overconfidence theory. Our paper will test the CEO 
overconfidence hypothesis on acquisitions performed on the Swedish stock market, and 
compare and contrast the results to prior research. 
This paper will further separate overconfidence into two categories; base 
overconfidence and observed overconfidence. Observed overconfidence is the net base 
overconfidence level after the impact of all affecting external factors. This paper will 
focus on the three previously mentioned possible determinants which can affect 
observed overconfidence. The purpose of these variables is to study whether the levels 
                                                 
6 SpencerStuart, ‘Spencer Stuart Board Index 2012’, SpencerStuart, 2012, p. 10. 
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of these factors in the board composition has an impact on overconfidence levels in the 
CEO, and ensure that ventures undertaken are rational, and potentially value creating.  
Previous research has mainly used acquisition frequency or similar measurements as the 
dependent variable, and used overconfidence as an independent variable explaining 
acquisition patterns. This study will further the understanding of overconfidence in 
economics by instead using overconfidence as the dependent variable, and test the 
impact of the aforementioned independent variables of board composition, or 
controlling variables such as CEO remuneration. 
The motivation for closely following the methodology of prior research is to enable 
comparison between our study and prior research without making the comparison 
subject to translation bias. It will also moderate the risk of errors in measuring 
overconfidence. 1.3 Problem Discussion 
Since we are basing our research on previous overconfidence theory, it is important to 
take a closer look at the shortcomings of these theories so that we are aware of their 
limitations. The hubris hypothesis has several limitations which has been corrected by 
the work of other authors over time, such as Malmendier & Tate and Doukas & 
Petmezas7,8,9. 
By comparing the three articles, it is apparent that they generally support each others’ 
claims but are not completely consistent in their findings. All three articles find 
evidence of managerial overconfidence by different means and in different geografical 
locations. Malmendier & Tate studied the US market and used options, while Doukas & 
Petmezas studied the UK market and used acquisition frequency and insider trading 
activity10,11. Their findings all support the overconfidence theory and in turn the hubris 
hypothesis. 
                                                 
7 Roll, R., ‘The Hubris Hypothesis of Corporate Takeovers’, Journal of Business, vol. 59, No.2, 2002.  
8Malmendier, U & Tate, G., 2007.  
9Doukas, J. & Petmezas, D., 2007.  
10Ibid. 
11Malmendier, U & Tate, G., 2007, p. 23. 
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Doukas & Petmezas’ proxies for overconfidence differ from those used by Malmendier 
& Tate. This is explained to be partly because the option proxy was not applicable to the 
UK market. Doukas & Petmezas also criticize the option proxy stating that it may not 
be reasonable to use as a proxy for overconfidence as it does not capture the 
overconfidence for the merger at hand, but instead captures the manager’s 
overconfidence for all the future performance of the company12. Furthermore, there are 
various reasons why a manager might exercise his options late other than to make a 
profit, such as positive inside information, signaling, board pressure, risk tolerance, 
taxes, and procrastination etc.13 
An issue common to previous studies, is that overconfidence is measured through 
proxies, as there is no practical way to accurately and directly measure CEO 
overconfidence. This creates a bias as it is difficult to ascertain which proxy most 
accurately captures overconfidence.  
From what we have presented in this section, we can discern that there is a need for 
continuous research in the field of overconfidence. All previous major published studies 
on the subject research how prevalent overconfidence is in mergers and acquisitions. 
We deem there is a need to research the potential factors that can affect the level of 
overconfidence of the CEO in order to better understand overconfidence.  
Furthermore, as most research has been conducted in countries such as the US and the 
UK, which uses the Anglo-Saxon corporate governance model, there is a need to 
research how overconfidence affects managers in widely different countries with 
different social systems. This includes the difference in labor union presence and the 
two tier corporate governance system in Sweden which has resulted in higher degree of 
outsider directors and lower degree of CEO presence on the board. 
We have chosen to study Sweden because of the geographical differences between 
Sweden and previously studied countries. Sweden differs from countries such as the 
U.S. or U.K. by not being an Anglo-Saxon country. Therefore performing the current 
study on data consisting of Swedish companies, this study will help explain whether 
                                                 
12Doukas, J. & Petmezas, D., 2007, p. 538-539. 
13Malmendier, U & Tate, G., 2007, p.24. 
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overconfidence is influenced by geographic factors. Furthermore, as stock options as 
rewards for managers were not very popular in Sweden during our selected time period, 
being as low as 5% of companies in 200314, it is an appropriate target for applying the 
same proxies that Doukas & Petmezas used. Because of these differences we theorize 
that our paper will continue to add to the overconfidence theory. 
We will follow Doukas & Petmezas’ work by using their insider dealings proxy over 
Malmendier & Tates option proxy, not only because stock purchase is more relevant on 
the Swedish market, but also because that proxy is criticized as too broad a 
measurement15. Furthermore, the insider dealing proxy more effectively compensates 
for empire building which the option proxy does not. 1.4 Purpose 
The purpose of this report is to examine how monitoring by the board of directors 
affects the overconfidence in CEOs in Sweden. We will measure overconfidence in 
acquisitions or mergers conducted by Swedish companies following the method of 
published journals. This report will add upon the published journals a dimension of 
‘managerial influence’ measured through: CEOs presence on supervisory board, board 
of director composition in terms of insiders and outsiders, and union representatives on 
the board of directors. These factors would either increase or decrease the influence of 
the CEO, which in turn would enable or prohibit him from acting upon his 
overconfidence.  
We specifically chose to examine Sweden because of the differences that exist between 
Swedish and American board member structure. It is not legal in Sweden for the CEO 
to also act as the chairman of the board, while it is legal and quite usual in the U.S.A.16. 
In Sweden, and most of Europe, the board of directors mostly consists of outsiders that 
monitor the performance of the CEO. Meanwhile, in America the boards mostly consist 
                                                 
14Aktiemarknadsnämnden, Incitamentsprogram-något om rättsutvecklingen samt olika program- och 
hedgestrukturer över tid, Retreived 2013-04-05, 
<http://www.aktiemarknadsnamnden.se/UserFiles/AMN25ar_kap08_medKOM_kap08-
165x242%20%282%29.pdf>, p. 108. 
15Doukas, J. &Petmezas, D., 2007, p. 539-540. 
16SpencerStuart, 2012.  
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of insiders 17 . Furthermore, the presence of employee- or union representatives is 
possible in Swedish companies, where unions have a strong influence. 
The questions we wish to answer are therefore two-fold, and formulated as follows: 
• Is overconfidence an underlying factor to acquisitions in Sweden, and if so, is it 
as common a phenomenon in Sweden as in previously studied countries, such as 
the U.S.A.? 
• Can the observed overconfidence level of the CEO be influenced through certain 
factors, such as CEO board presence or outsiders and employee representatives 
on the board of directors?  1.5 Definitions and Scope 1.5.1 Definitions 
TABLE 1.1 – DEFINITIONS OF KEYWORDS IN REPORT  
Overconfidence Overconfidence is defined as irrational belief in one’s own ability to 
create value for the company and shareholders, or synergies, 
exceeding the general consensus’ estimates. 
Base 
Overconfidence 
The inherent overconfidence of a CEO prior to any external 
influences or effects. This variable is defined as the intercept of the 
regression equation. 
Observed 
overconfidence 
The overconfidence observed through the proxies used in this study. 
It is the dependent variable of the regression equation. It defined as 
the net overconfidence, meaning the overconfidence after all external 
influences or effects.  
Insider Insiders in this study refer to a director of the board of directors’ 
relationship to the company. A director is defined as an insider when 
(s)he is a manager or other employee of the company, or a family 
member to the CEO. This also includes the union or employee 
representatives who are employed by the company. 
Outsider This study defines an outsider director as a board member who does 
not fulfill any of the criterions of being an insider.  
                                                 
17Denis, D. & McConnell, J., ‘International corporate governance’, Journal of Financial and Quantitative 
Analysis, vol. 38, Issue 01, 2003, p. 2-4. 
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1.5.2 Scope 
The first delimitation we make in this report is that we only include companies that have 
completed an acquisition or merger within the specified timeframe. Since previous 
studies have already empirically proven that an overconfident manager is more likely to 
perform an acquisition, we do not consider acquisition frequency relevant to our 
questions. We will instead only investigate whether overconfidence has been a 
motivator in Swedish acquisitions. The next delimitation is to limit the sample to 
acquisitions conducted by Swedish companies. This is to ensure that we can answer the 
first question posited in our purpose section, and in order to be able to gather relevant 
data. 
We have also excluded all financial companies, utility companies, and companies 
owned by government departments and municipalities from the sample. Financial and 
utility companies were removed due to higher restrictions in the industry. Companies 
owned by the government were removed due to the fact that financial gain might be a 
secondary or non-existent goal of the company, and will therefore have other incentives 
behind the acquisitions.  1.7 Disposition 
In the second section, the relevant theory to this report will be presented. We will 
initially research overconfidence and the theories it is based on. We will then add the 
theory which is the bases for our three hypotheses, such as monitoring and division of 
decision making and decision control. Finally, with this theory foundation, we present 
our three hypotheses which will be the basis for the regression analysis.  
In the third section we will detail our methodology in creating this report. First we will 
describe the method used to create the proxies for measuring overconfidence. Secondly 
we will explain how we design the regression analysis, and the relevant variables. Here 
we also list the assumptions we make when creating the regression. We will here 
explain how we model our study after Malmendier & Tate, and Doukas & Petmezas, 
and what differences and additions we will have along with the predictions we have for 
our variables. Finally, we will list the data sources and databases used for our data, and 
the criterion of the sample construction. 
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In the fourth section we will present the data collected. We show the company sample 
and subsample in the descriptive statistics subsection, and we present the results from 
our regressions. 
In the fifth section we will interpret the results from the descriptive statistics as well as 
the performance of the different variables in the regressions. Furthermore, we will also 
compare our findings with Malmendier & Tate and Doukas & Petmezas work as well as 
comparing possible geographical differences. 
In the sixth and final section we will present the conclusions that we will have drawn 
based on the results and analysis in sections four and five, while suggesting possible 
future fields of study. 
  
14 
 
 
2. Theory 
In this section the findings of previous research is presented in order to give a 
theoretical foundation to the study’s purpose. First, the three major papers in the field 
are explained. This is followed by a theoretical foundation for monitoring and board 
vigilance. Finally, we present our three hypotheses and our empirical predictions of the 
results of our study. 2.1 Definition History 
In the article "The Hubris Hypothesis of Corporate Takeovers", the author, Richard 
Roll, argues that the reason that some company’s conducts mergers and acquisitions that 
are in fact value destroying is because of hubris in the management18. In this paper Roll 
coins the hubris hypothesis, which can be considered to be one of the cornerstones in 
behavioral finance theory. 
The merger or acquisition of a target company is done primarily to increase the value of 
the buying company, and enable a growth speed higher than the company’s organic 
growth. The management of the buying company will before placing a bid on a target 
company conduct a valuation of the target. This valuation will include not only the 
value of the assets but also any possible synergy effects that can be obtained. The value 
that is calculated is then compared to the market price. If the calculated value is less 
than the market value the acquisition is abandoned as there will be no value increase 
with going through with the acquisition. If the calculated value is greater than the 
market value then the acquisition can lead to an increase in the value of the firm and a 
bid is thus made on the target company. 
Roll explains that when a manager bids on a target firm, (s)he does so with some 
amount of hubris 19 . This hubris can convince the manager there are synergy 
opportunities to seize, even if in reality there are none. This, in addition with inflated 
cash flow projections based on an overconfident estimate of ability to increase revenues 
of the target company, can lead to incorrect valuations. In the article, Roll explains that 
if an acquisition has no synergy gains the result will have three effects:   
                                                 
18Roll, R., 1986.  
19Roll, R., 1986, p.199-200. 
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1. The combined value of the bidder and the target company will be slightly less 
than before the acquisition. 
2. The value of the bidding firm will decrease when the bid is announced. 
3. The value of the target firm will increase when the bid is announced. 
 
The first effect can be explained by the second and third effect. The decrease in the 
bidding firms’ value will usually be larger than the increase in the target firm. The 
reason for the second and third effect is the result of market expectations. This implies 
that there is no gain from acquisitions if there are no synergy effects.   
The Hubris hypothesis explains the behavior of the manager when (s)he chooses to go 
through with an acquisition even though the value gain is in question. The average 
manager has the opportunity to make only a few takeover offers during his career. Even 
if the manager has learned from his past mistakes of making bad bids, (s)he is unlikely 
to refrain from bidding on an acquisition as the number of average acquisitions that 
(s)he will be able to make is limited and small. Other than this, it is the fact that 
managers might convince themselves that the valuation of the firm is correct and that 
the market price does not include the value that will arise from synergy effects if the 
companies are combined. This is what causes the overvaluation in the acquisition. 
Roll also notes that not all takeovers are fueled by hubris. If all takeovers resulted in a 
loss and so all takeovers were prompted by hubris, then shareholders could stop these 
actions by forbidding managers from making any acquisition bids on anything. Since 
this is not the case in the real world, then not all acquisitions are based on hubris. 
There have been various studies striving to explain this behavior in management. One 
study explains management overconfidence with factors such as illusion of control, bias 
in predicting financial outcome, and self-enhancement tendencies, which mean an 
exaggerated belief in performance improvements stemming from personal expertise20. 
Further research has also linked illusion of control with optimism. Kahneman & Ripe 
explains the phenomenon with optimists underestimating role of chance in their 
dealings, holding on to an illusion of control, which will make them underestimate risk, 
                                                 
20De Bondt, W., Tversky, A. & Wood, A., Behavioral Finance and Decision Theory in Investment 
Management, AIMR, Charlottesville, 1995. 
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and exaggerate their belief in their ability to control events 21. These findings help 
explain Malmendier & Tate’s results in a 2007 paper where they found overconfident 
managers being more likely to go through with an acquisition, regardless if it in reality 
was value destroying or not, if perceived synergies are high22. 2.2 Overconfidence in Mergers & Acquisitions 
Rather than hubris, further research into the subject use the term CEO overconfidence to 
describe the hubris in CEOs in acquiring firms. In a paper from 2007, Malmendier & 
Tate present findings of their empirical data and conclusions regarding how 
overconfidence in CEOs and managers results in overpayment of target companies in 
mergers and acquisitions which in turn leads to a reduction in shareholder wealth23. 
Some of the work is based on Roll’s hubris hypothesis, and Malmendier & Tate 
develops this notion and states that CEOs overestimates their ability to generate returns 
which leads to them overestimating the return they can generate from taking over a 
company24. This in turn leads to overpaying when acquiring another company, which is 
value destroying. In the article we learn that by comparing overconfident managers with 
regular managers, we find that overconfident managers are more likely to conduct 
mergers and acquisitions as they see more opportunities for profitable acquisitions 
compared to a regular manager who will refrain from acquisitions as they believe that 
synergies are hard to take advantage of. 
Not only does the manager overestimate the return they can generate internally, but they 
also believe that outside investors undervalue their company. Because overconfident 
managers believe that their company is undervalued, issuing equity or debt will not be 
profitable, and instead they prefer internal financing as this is cheaper and avoids the 
undervaluation problem. Malmendier & Tate also found that managers might even 
forgo an acquisition or merger completely if external financing is necessary. 
                                                 
21Kahneman, D. & Riepe, M. W., ‘Aspects of investor psychology’, Journal of Portfolio Management, 
1998, Vol. 24, p. 55. 
22Malmendier, U & Tate, G., 2007, p.22, 42. 
23Ibid,  p.42 
24Ibid, p.26. 
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In the article, Malmendier & Tate uses two proxies to determine if a manager is 
overconfident or not. The first proxy for overconfidence is tested by monitoring the 
personal portfolio of CEOs and how they change with the belief of the company's future 
performance. A CEO’s wealth is undiversified, as his compensation is partly based on 
equity, as well as a majority of his wealth being tied to his occupation25. Because of this 
(s)he should be risk averse and should try to reduce his exposure to company specific 
risk. This is achieved through exercising company stock options which the manager 
owns prior to their expiration, provided that the option is in the money, as keeping the 
options until expiration would imply that the manager is willing to take on more risk for 
a higher reward26. If the CEO keeps the options until expiration, it can be interpreted as 
the manager being overconfident by overestimating the firm’s future returns. 
Malmendier & Tate found that CEOs who does not diversify their portfolios, but rather 
keeps their options until expiration, are significantly more likely to conduct a merger at 
any point. This effect is largest in companies with large amounts of internal funds, 
which show that managers do in fact prefer internal funding over external. These results 
helped Malmendier & Tate to confirm that their overconfidence hypothesis was 
correct 27 . From their study, Malmendier & Tate found that investors react more 
negatively to merger bids conducted by longholder CEOs 28, where longholders are 
defined as CEOs who opt to keep their options to their year of expiration, while the 
option is 40% or more in-the-money 29 . This can partly be explained by the 
announcement effect as investors are aware of how overconfidence can negatively 
affect mergers. This effect is similar to how the value of the bidder is affected when the 
bid is announced in Rolls article30. 
Another discovery in Malmendier & Tate’s study is that overconfident managers are 
more likely to undergo with a diversifying acquisition. This is explained with 
                                                 
25Jen, F., O’Connor, P. & Ogden, J., Advanced Corporate Finance: Policies and Strategies, New Jersey, 
Pearson Education, 2002, p 86. 
26Lambert, R., Larcker, D., &Verrecchia, R., ‘Portfolio considerations in valuing executive 
compensation’, Journal of Accounting Research, Vol. 29, 1991, p. 129–149. 
27Malmendier, U & Tate, G., 2007, p.42. 
28Ibid, p. 34. 
29Ibid, p. 24. 
30Roll, R., 1986. p.201-202. 
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overconfident CEO’s overestimate the synergies they can create from the acquisition, 
even though the companies operates in different industries. It is important to 
differentiate diversifying mergers arising from agency costs and from overconfidence. 
As explained in Brown & Sarma, an overconfident manager believes that the investment 
is in the interest of the shareholders, whereas the diversifying acquisition stemming 
from agency costs is a mean to misuse corporate resources in order to lower risk level31. 
Which of the two categories the acquisition falls into can be measured by using the first 
proxy, which uses the portfolio investment patterns of the CEO. In the case of agency 
costs the CEO will lean towards divesting in the own company, as (s)he is aware that it 
is a value destroying activity, whereas the overconfident CEO will further invest in the 
company. 
Malmendier & Tate also presented several alternative explanations for managers to hold 
their options until expiration. These alternatives included taxes & dividends, board 
pressure, past performance, CEO preference and CEOs beliefs of the future. However, 
many of the alternatives are found to be irrelevant or disproven, and it is concluded that 
the relation between option exercise and mergers is the proxy most consistent with 
overconfidence32. 
The second proxy that Malmendier & Tate use for determining overconfidence is how 
CEOs are covered by the press33. By examining business presses, Malmendier & Tate 
collected data on how CEOs were characterized. The characteristics used were 
"confident", "optimistic" versus "reliable", "cautious", "conservative", "practical", 
"frugal" and "steady".  The characteristics "confident" and "optimistic" were found to be 
correlated positively with optimistic beliefs of future company performance.  
The media coverage proxy is based on trait theory from the field of psychology. Relying 
on personality traits in common language has been studied thoroughly by many 
researchers who have all come to the same conclusion, which is that all personal traits 
                                                 
31Brown, R. & Sarma, N., ‘CEO Overconfidence, CEO Dominance and Corporate Acquisitions’, Journal 
of Economics and Business, vol. 59, 2007, p. 360. 
32Malmendier, U & Tate, G., 2007, p. 34-36. 
33Malmendier, U & Tate, G., 2007, p.21 
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can be divided into five distinct categories that are universal across cultures34. These 
five categories are usually called “the big five”, coined by Lewis Goldberg, or 
commonly termed the five factor model. The five personality factors are: openness, 
conscientiousness, extroversion, agreeableness and neuroticism 35 . Since personality 
traits can be identified in common language, it is reasonable to believe that 
overconfidence can be identified by examining what a CEO says or how (s)he is 
portrayed by others in the media. Authors such as Brown & Sarma also utilize a media 
coverage proxy similar to Malmendier & Tates which adds further credibility to the 
proxy.  
It was also revealed that if an overconfident CEO has access to cheap resources such as 
internal funds, that CEO is more likely to conduct acquisitions of a lower quality, than if 
there are no cheap funds available. The empirical analysis performed by Malmendier & 
Tate in the article confirmed their two overconfidence predictions. The first prediction 
was “In firms with abundant internal resources, overconfident CEOs are more likely to 
conduct acquisitions than non-overconfident CEOs36”. The second prediction was "If 
overconfident CEOs do more mergers than rational CEOs, then the average value 
created in mergers is lower for overconfident than for rational CEOs37. 
Further studies by Doukas & Petmezas has researched whether managerial 
overconfidence has any important effects on the short- and long term abnormal returns 
for shareholders in the acquiring firm after the firm performs a mergers38. Furthermore, 
from this they address whether or not overconfident managers act in the interest of the 
shareholders when they perform mergers as most mergers does in fact not result in 
positive returns for the shareholders of the acquiring firm. Based on the methodology of 
Malmendier & Tate, they also introduce two new proxies for measuring 
overconfidence; (1) high order acquisition deals, and (2) insider dealings. 
                                                 
34Brown, R. & Sarma, N., 2007, Page 362. 
35Srivastava, S, University of Oregon, Measuring the Big Five Personality Factors, Retrieved 2013-03-
21, <http://psdlab.uoregon.edu/bigfive.html>. 
36Malmendier, U & Tate, G., 2007, p. 22. 
37Ibid, p. 23. 
38Doukas, J. &Petmezas, D., 2007, p.531. 
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The first proxy, high order acquisition deals, means that Doukas & Petmezas chose to 
consider a manager that performed five or more acquisitions within a time period of 
three years as overconfident. The reasoning used for this measure is based on several 
other articles that consider the undertaking of multiple acquisitions within a very short 
time period as a reckless and poor investment strategy which would indicate 
overconfidence in the manager39,40,41. This theory is also confirmed by Malmendier & 
Tate, who found that overconfident managers perform more acquisitions.  
The second proxy Doukas & Petmezas use is the insider dealings of managers in the 
acquiring company. This proxy is based on the stock option proxy used by Malmendier 
and Tate. However, instead of using in-the-money stock options as a measure of 
managerial overconfidence, Doukas and Petmezas chose to use the purchase of 
company shares when the firm is close to a merger, as a measure for overconfidence42. 
The reason for using this proxy is the assumption that managers, because they are 
overconfident, will want to increase their share of the company close to a merger which 
they believe will be profitable, in order to increase their own wealth, as the stock will be 
more valuable after the acquisition. This alternative proxy is more apt to company 
cultures where stock option programs are not as common. Furthermore, Doukas & 
Petmezas argue that the in-the-money option proxy measures overconfidence for the 
entire future performance of the company and not just the merger, which means that this 
proxy might not always indicate overconfidence 43. In countries where stock option 
bonuses are infrequent, such as the UK, which is the studied country in their article, it is 
more fitting to use the similar overconfidence proxy of insider trading. 
Doukas & Petmezas found that the insider trading accurately describes managerial 
overconfidence. Furthermore they also found evidence of overconfidence in managers 
through their buying habits around mergers.  
                                                 
39Malmendier, U & Tate, G., 2007, p.534. 
40Baker, M. P. & Wurgler, J., ‘Market timing and capital structure’, Journal of Finance, Vol. 57, 2002, p. 
1–32. 
41Jenter, D. C., ‘Market timing and managerial portfolio decisions’, Journal of Finance, Vol. 60, 2005, p. 
1903-49. 
42 Doukas, J. & Petmezas, D., 2007, p.535. 
43Ibid, p. 539. 
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When creating a model for measuring CEO overconfidence through stock- or option 
purchases, one has to take into account the possibility of empire building. Both 
Malmendier & Tate and Doukas & Petmezas state that they compensate for the 
possibility of empire building in their research by separating intentionally value 
destroying behavior and behavior brought on by overconfidence44,45. Malmendier & 
Tate’s option proxy is supposed to remove the empire building factor from 
consideration by the reasoning that CEOs who exercise their options late are acting in 
what they believe are the best interest of the shareholders. Furthermore, the managers 
are also personally investing in the company which is in direct opposite to the actions of 
an empire building manager.  
Doukas & Petmezas compensate for the possibility of empire building in a different way 
from Malmendier & Tate. By using a different proxy, insider dealings, they circumvent 
the problem of empire building by examining not only how much stock that is 
purchased after the merger, but also how much is sold before the merger. An empire 
building CEO will most likely sell his shares before any merger while (s)he cannot 
exercise his options until the exercise date. 
As previous research has shown overconfidence is a problem which can negatively 
affect a company in similar manners such as moral hazard or agency costs. There is 
therefore a need to remove or in the least moderate the impact of CEO overconfidence. 
Our study has chosen to research the impact of board composition as a means to 
moderate CEO overconfidence.  2.3 Monitoring & Board Composition 
In a paper by Hayward & Hambrick (1997), the authors found that various factors can 
have an impact on the level of overconfidence in the CEO46. One of these factors is 
board vigilance and monitoring47, which is the focus of this paper. 
                                                 
44Malmendier, U & Tate, G., 2007, p. 30. 
45Doukas, J. & Petmezas, D., 2007, p. 538-539. 
46 Hayward, M. & Hambrick, D., ’Explaining the premiums paid for large acquisitions: evidence of CEO 
hubris’, Administrative Science Quarterly, Vol. 42, No. 1, 1997. 
47 Ibid, p. 109.  
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2.3.1 Monitoring 
There is a natural conflict of interest between the stakeholders of a company and the 
manager, which is explained by agency theory. The manager will try to maximize his 
remuneration for as little effort as possible while the stakeholders will want to maximize 
their returns for as little cost as possible. As managers have access to the company's net 
cash flow, they have the possibility to use this for their own private benefits such as 
extracting private rents, or perks, which are value destroying for the stakeholders. To 
reduce the moral hazard of the managers, the stakeholders can implement monitoring48. 
Myers lists two specific reasons for monitoring49. The first is to confirm that actual 
investments have been made. This means that actual goods or services for the company 
has been bought, and not just reported, which would exclude the possibility of managers 
taking private rents. The second is to not only confirm transactions, but also block 
certain investments that could give the manager private gains, or be value destroying for 
shareholders50. 
Because of the conflict of interest the stakeholders will want to monitor the behavior of 
the managers. Stakeholders cannot perfectly monitor the behavior of managers as 
information is not symmetrical and thus must incur a cost, either in the way of time, 
money or both, to increase their information of the agent51. This means that should the 
cost of monitoring exceed the loss from unmonitored practices, a stakeholder might 
choose not to monitor. This is often the case with smaller stakeholders, who instead rely 
on the larger stakeholders monitoring at their own expense, and is called the Freeriding 
Problem, and is often the case in American companies, where the ownership is wide. 
Monitoring can be divided into external and internal monitoring and ranges from 
behavioral contracts, debt issuance, dividends, the capital market, board of directors etc. 
In this report we will focus on the aspect of monitoring by the board through the 
member composition. 
                                                 
48Jen, F., O’Connor, P. & Ogden, J., 2002. p.426. 
49Myers, S., ‘Outside Equity’, The Journal of Finance, Vol. 55, No. 3, 2000. 
50Myers, S., 2000, p. 37-38. 
51Meckling, H. & Jensen, C., ‘Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs, and Ownership 
Structure’, Journal of Financial Economics, Vol. 3, No. 4, 1976. 
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2.3.2 CEO on Board of Directors 
Some methods of monitoring are regulated, such as the guidelines for financial 
statements in a public company. However, there are other means of monitoring, such as 
board composition and monitoring management. Fama & Jensen found that the board of 
directors can be an effective monitoring solution, depending on the incentives of the 
board members 52 . They argue that a successful company often separate decision 
making, from decision control53. This would imply that having a CEO, who is in charge 
of initiating and implement decisions such as acquisitions, on the board would have a 
negative impact on monitoring from the board of directors. This argues that a split 
leadership structure would result in the CEO performing less value destroying actions or 
make investments which would not be in the shareholders’ interest. 
In another article Fama & Jensen address the issue of the separation of decision maker 
and risk taker54. Unless there is proper monitoring, the CEO can feel incentivized to 
take on risky investments, as it is the shareholders that hold the risk, which gives rise to 
agency costs. However, this is not a one sided issue, as there are also benefits of having 
a CEO on the board of directors. While it would lower the amount of monitoring, it 
would also limit the CEO’s authority and ability to perform55.  2.3.3 Outsiders vs. Insiders on Board of Directors 
Fama & Jensen also look at board composition, and has found that outsider board 
members have a higher incentive to monitor managers and curtail managerial 
discretion56. This is motivated by the fact that outsider directives have less incentive to 
bend to CEO pressure, but rather value personal reputation as an efficient and skilled 
independent decision maker. Furthermore, it would stand to reason that an insider 
would feel more pressure to follow CEO decisions, as they might feel disagreeing with 
                                                 
52Fama, E., & Jensen, M., ‘Agency problems and Residual Claims’, Journal of Law and Economics, vol. 
26, No. 2, 1983, p. 345. 
53Fama, E., & Jensen, M., 1983, p. 345 
54Fama, E., & Jensen, M., ‘Separation of Ownership and Control’, Journal of Law and Economics, vol. 
26, No. 2, 1983, p. 301-302. 
55Allen, M., Renner, C. & Schooley, D., ‘Shareholder Proposals, Board Composition, and Leadership 
Structure’, Journal of managerial issues, Vol. 22, 2010, No. 2. 
56Fama, E., & Jensen, M., 1983. p.516.  
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the CEO will negatively impact their career opportunities within the company. This 
would make outsider board members better at challenging CEO decision. 
Malmendier & Tate address the importance of the board of directors and their influence 
on the CEO. Overconfident CEOs respond to financial constraints put down by the 
board of directors as this will limit the cash available for mergers and acquisitions57. 
This means that the board of directors can counteract overconfidence in managers by 
enforcing a limiting capital structure. Malmendier & Tate also notes that independent 
directors can and should take on more active roles because they possess the possibility 
to control overconfident CEOs. Hayward & Hambrick also found that inside directors 
likely are pressured by the CEO, or might even share his hubris, when performing 
acquisitions, which would lower board vigilance58.  
The theory that an independent board has a positive effect on financial performance has 
further been empirically proven by various studies 59 . However, there are also 
contradicting studies, which states that there are no correlation between composition 
and financial performance, or in some cases that outsiders might actually lead to worse 
performance60. This data is based on the theory that increasing the amount of outsiders 
on the board of directors will, while providing higher monitoring, lower the insight and 
intimate knowledge of the company61. This would indicate that there is a trade-off 
between lowering agency costs through monitoring and having high competence on the 
board of directors. 
                                                 
57Malmendier, U & Tate, G., 2007, p.30. 
58Hayward, M. & Hambrick, D., 1997, p. 121. 
59Booth, Millon Cornette & Tehranian (2002) - Baysinger and Butler, 1985; Brickley and James, 1987; 
Byrd and Hickman, 1992; Lee et al., 1992; Mayers et al., 1997; Rosenstein and Wyatt, 1990 and 
Shivdasani, 1993. 
60Bhagat, S., & Black, B., ‘The uncertain Relationship Between Board Composition and Firm 
Performance’, Business Lawyer, 1999, Vol. 54. 
61Allen, M., Renner, C. & Schooley, D., 2010. p.154. 
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2.4 Hypothesis and Empirical Results 2.4.1 Hypothesis 1 – CEO Presence on Board of Directors 
In Sweden roughly 45% of the CEOs are also present on the board of directors62. 
However, in the sample of overconfident CEOs presence on the board of directors is 
66%, as is shown in section 4.1 of this study. While there are signs that having the CEO 
as a member on the board does not impact financial performance63, our hypothesis is 
that a CEO who sits on the board can exert influence on decision making, such as 
undertaking an acquisitions, to a higher degree compared to a CEO who is not. (S)he 
would also be able to counteract monitoring performed by the board of directors as 
mentioned in previous section. Should the CEO be overconfident, (s)he would have 
more ability to act upon it if the board vigilance is compromised. 
Hypothesis 1, H1: CEO Presence on the board of directors will increase observed 
overconfidence. 2.4.2 Hypothesis 2 – Outsider Monitoring Effect on Board of Directors 
As described in previous section, unaffiliated board members are more likely to 
question CEO decision making if it is deemed value destroying. As they are not 
employees of the firm itself, but rather employed by the shareholders to govern the 
company, they act as a monitoring device to spot fraudulent or value destroying 
activities. Our second hypothesis is therefore that the higher quota of outsider board of 
directors, the more vigilant the monitoring will be, which would moderate the CEOs 
overconfidence.  
H2: An increase in outsiders on the board of directors will decrease the observed 
overconfidence. 2.4.3 Hypothesis 3 – Employee Representatives on Board of Directors.  
Our third hypothesis is based on union or employee representation of the board of 
directors. This hypothesis is based on the fact that an overconfident manager may 
destroy value with an unprofitable acquisition or merger. This would in turn adversely 
                                                 
62Sjätte AP-fondens styrelseprogram, Vd I styrelsen – nej tack!, Retreived 2013-05-08, 
<http://www.apfond6.se/sv/Nyhetsbrev-Styrelseutveckling/Vd-i-styrelsen--nej-tack/> 
63Malmendier, U & Tate, G., 2007, p. 25. 
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affect the work force of the company. This could take shape in different forms, such as 
cash restrictions from an unprofitable acquisition resulting in a freeze of wages 
increases, or even lay-offs. Therefore it would be in the interest of the unions and 
employees to monitor the CEO activities and investments to ensure that they will not 
result in a worsening of working conditions. Our sample consists of Swedish 
companies, where unions have a strong presence, and 37% of the sample boards have 
employee representation. Therefore the power to affect managerial decision-making, 
and deter value destroying activities.  
H3: An increase in employee representatives on the board of directors will 
decrease the observed overconfidence. 2.4.4 Empirical Prediction of Results 
In this report we follow the methodology of Malmendier & Tate and Doukas & 
Petmezas, allowing us to compare our results with theirs to find measurable 
differences64,65. In the case of Malmendier & Tate the data of CEO presence on the 
board of directors is that 38% of their CEO sample sits on the board66. However, this 
number measures when (s)he has accumulated all three titles of CEO, President and 
Chairman. Other statistics indicate that the CEO is almost always present on the board 
of directors in USA, and also holds the title of chairman in 57% of companies per 
201267. Following Hypothesis 1 of this report, this should result in a lower level of 
overconfidence in Swedish acquisitions, as the CEO presence in this study’s sample is 
66%. 
The two earlier studies do not touch upon insiders and outsiders in their sample, and we 
cannot directly compare this variable. However, as studies indicate, ownership 
composition and other factors have resulted in a higher amount of outsider board 
members in Europe68,69. The total number of outsiders on the board of directors in USA 
                                                 
64Malmendier, U. & Tate, G., 2007. 
65Doukas, J. &Petmezas, D., 2007. 
66Malmendier, U. & Tate, G., 2007, p. 25. 
67 SpencerStuart, 2012, p. 10. 
68Enriques, L. & Volpin, P., ‘Corporate governance reforms in continental Europe’, Journal of Economic 
Perspectives, vol. 21, no.1, 2007, p.117. 
69Denis, D. & McConnell, J., 2003, p. 2-4. 
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is 59.1% 70, whereas this study’s sample has a mean of 83%. Therefore following 
Hypothesis 2, we predict that we will see a lower prevalence of overconfidence in 
mergers and acquisition activity in Sweden. Finally, for our third hypothesis there is no 
prior research to base our prediction on. 
  
                                                 
70 Booth, J., Cornett, M., & Tehranian H., ‘Boards of Directors, Ownership, and Regulation’, Journal of 
Banking & Finance,  vol. 26, 2002,  page 1980.  
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3. Data & Methodology 
In this section we present our methodology and the two proxies that we have chosen for 
determining overconfidence. The first proxy utilizes the CEOs insider trading activities, 
whereas the second proxy utilizes media coverage of the CEO. This is followed by an 
explanation of our independent variables and the regression and its components. The 
final section presents data collection methodology and data sources used. 3.1 Measuring Overconfidence 
This paper will use two proxies when measuring overconfidence. The first proxy for 
overconfidence, OC1, will be based on an alternative measure for overconfidence 
developed by Doukas & Petmezas. This proxy is based on insider trading by the CEO 
around the time of the acquisition. This data will be collected on insynsregistret’s 
database as detailed in section 3.5.3.  This proxy will be based on the net acquisition of 
shares during the time span of six months prior to the acquisition announcement, up to 
two months following. By net acquisition the net value of transactions performed during 
the time is referred to. Should the CEO buy shares in his company for a value of 5000 
SEK, and then proceed to sell shares for 2000 SEK, the net acquisition will be 3000 
SEK. In cases where the CEO has an insider position it other companies apart from the 
acquiring company only transactions on shares of the acquiring company will be 
counted. Following the theory of an overconfident CEO detailed in section 2, a CEO 
would believe (s)he creates value with his investments, and thereby increase the share 
price. As a rational investor, the overconfident CEO would therefore have a higher net 
investment rate. To adjust for differing wealth between CEOs, we have created a value 
which adjusts for his salary, meaning that the CEO annual remuneration is used as a 
simplifying proxy for the total CEO wealth. The first proxy is based on net acquisition 
as a part of his annual salary, and the equation for OC1 is as follows: 
OC1 = Net acquisition value/Annual salary 
The second proxy is based on ‘Trait Theory’ and use the aforementioned Five Factor 
model as a basis. The method for using this theory is derived from Hayward & 
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Hambrick (1997), who provides three proxies for measuring CEO hubris71. The one this 
paper will utilize is media coverage. Initially, data is collected as described in section 
3.5, where mentions of specific keywords are collected. The construction of this 
variable will then be based on the equation in Brown & Sarma (2007), which allows 
adjustment for number of mentions. 
The variable to measure OC2, the second component of our overconfidence integer, is 
as follows: 
𝑂𝐶2 = (�𝐴1 + (𝐴2 × 2)� + �𝐵1 + (𝐵2 × 2)�)(1 + (𝐶1 + (𝐶2 × 2) + �𝐷 10� �)  
A is the number of articles which mention keywords in column A in Table 3.1. The 
inclusion of A1 and A2 is made to allow for different weights of the keyword used in the 
article. For example if the keyword självsäker is used in passing or loosely it is placed 
in column A1, and if the keyword is signaling strong overconfidence, it is placed in 
column A2. B is the number of articles using the keywords in column B, and C the 
number of articles mentioning keywords in table C, and both groups follow the same 
weight rules as group A. D, the last variable in the equation is the total number of article 
mentions of the CEO within the timeframe. In the data that we collected, the number of 
articles that mention the CEO is much larger than the number of articles that mention 
keywords. This resulted in very small numbers that might be tough to grasp from a 
quick inspection. Furthermore, it would not be appropriate to give the same weight to 
the keywords in column C, as they are clear indicators of lack of overconfidence, 
whereas column D simply signifies lack of evidence either supporting or denouncing 
overconfidence. To counteract this, and to make the results easier to interpret, we 
decided to divide the D group by 10. 
 Following the delimitations of Hayward & Hambrick and Malmendier & Tate, we will 
limit articles to three years prior to the first acquisition. Secondly, we will only collect 
articles up until the announcement date. This is done in order to counteract a flaw in this 
proxy, where the proxy results are colored by the journalist’s personal opinion and 
                                                 
71Hayward, M. & Hambrick, D., 1997, p. 113-114. 
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focus of content. An announcement of a merger or acquisition gives signals to the press, 
which the journalist might interpret as overconfidence or hubris, even though this might 
not necessarily be the case. This will in turn affect the content of the articles, and the 
proxy results. In cases where the CEO has performed multiple acquisitions during the 
period, only articles up until the first acquisitions will be utilized, rather than individual 
three year samples prior to each acquisition. One important delimitation of this 
approach is that the data is limited to our sample. This means that there is a possibility 
that the CEO has performed acquisitions prior to our sample period of 2000-2005, 
which would affect article writers’ opinions. This delimitation is performed due to lack 
of resources, and that we are measuring the current hubris of the CEO, meaning that 
historic behavior are of less importance to our paper than current events.   
This proxy is subject to certain bias, as is covered in Malmendier & Tate (2007). First, 
there is a possibility that the CEO shows a false sense of confidence to representatives 
of the media in order to boost the stock price. However, as is noted, this is a method that 
does not hold over time, as it would hurt the CEO and company integrity and reliability. 
The second bias mentioned is that the CEO might be trying to create a hype surrounding 
the acquisition, and thus increasing chances of a positive outcome of the investment. 
This bias is counteracted by including the keywords in column C, and also measuring 
the amount of mentions in newspapers over time72.  3.2 Measuring Independent Variables 
The variable corresponding to hypothesis 1, CEO presence on the board of directors, is 
named CEOBoard. It is a binary variable, with the variable taking the value of 0 when 
the CEO is not on the board, and 1 when the CEO has a seat on the board. 
The second variable, outsiders on the board of directors, is called Outs and is a variable 
that will take on a value between 0 to 1 according to the percentage of outsiders on the 
board of directors. 
                                                 
72Malmendier, U. & Tate, G., 2007, p. 40.  
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The third independent variable is called Workrep and is a variable that will take on a 
value between 0 and 1 according to the percentage of employee representatives on the 
board.   3.3 Regression Analysis 
The method to be used to test our hypotheses is performing a multivariate regression 
using the ordinary least squares method. The regression formula is formulated as 
follow, and variables are presented in table 3.1. In addition to the three previously 
introduced independent variables, four controlling variables are also included. Further 
explanation of chosen variables and null hypotheses are presented in section 3.4.  
𝑂𝐶1+2 = 𝛽1 + 𝛽2𝐶𝐸𝑂𝐵𝑜𝑎𝑟𝑑 + 𝛽3𝑂𝑢𝑡𝑠 + 𝛽4𝑊𝑜𝑟𝑘𝑅𝑒𝑝 + 𝛽5𝑀2𝐵 + 𝛽6𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒 + 𝛽7𝐶𝐹+ 𝛽8𝐶𝐸𝑂𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑝 + 𝜀 
TABLE 3.1 EXPLANATIONS OF REGRESSION VARIABLES 
Variable Description 
OC1 
 
OC2 
 
CEOBoard 
 
Outs 
WorkRep 
 
Size 
 
 
CF 
 
M2B 
CEOcomp 
Overconfidence proxy measured through the CEO’s net acquisition 
of company stock divided by his annual salary. 
Overconfidence proxy measured through mentions of keywords 
listed in Table 3.2. 
Binary variable taking the value 0 if the CEO does not have a seat 
on the board, and 1 if (s)he does. 
The percent of outsider directors on the board of directors. 
The percent of employee representatives, through unions or 
otherwise, on the board of directors.  
Size of the company as measured by average shares outstanding 
multiplied by the share value one day prior to acquisition 
announcement date. 
Cash flows as defined by the year’s result plus depreciation added 
back. 
The ratio market to book value of equity for the company. 
Annual salary and remuneration (excluding pensions) for the year 
of the acquisition. 
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To test the validity of the regression outputs a series of tests will be performed. The first 
test to be performed on our data samples is a Jarque-Bera test on our overconfidence 
subsample. This in order to test whether the sample data is standard distributed. This is 
of importance as standard distributed data is a prerequisite for performing an OLS 
(ordinary least squares) regression. The Jarque-Bera test uses the data’s kurtosis and 
skewedness in order to gauge whether the data has an acceptable level of deviation from 
standard distribution. 
Furthermore, a multicollinearity test called Variance Inflation Factors will be 
performed. Finally, robustness tests will be performed on the data, to ascertain if the 
independent variables can withstand modification. Two robustness tests have been 
constructed, each modifying one of the two proxies. 
The first robustness test will remove the impact of CEO compensation from the 
formula. Compensation for CEO remuneration was added in order to account for 
different levels of wealth in the CEOs. This makes the assumption that a large portion 
of the wealth is gained from his salary. Should however CEOs wealth be more 
diversified, and the managers be independently wealthy, this assumption is erroneous. 
The robustness test will assess this by simply using net acquisition value as a proxy for 
OC1.  
The second robustness test is performed on the media coverage proxy. The current 
formula is constructed as such, that one mention of a keyword in column A or B will 
automatically categorize the CEO as overconfident, regardless of the number of 
mentions of keywords in column C. This gives a higher weight to mentions of keywords 
signaling optimism or overconfidence compared to keywords signaling the opposite. 
We have therefore constructed an alternative formula which allows mentions of 
keywords in column C to cancel out A and B keywords. The new formula is: 
𝑂𝐶2 = (�𝐴1 + (𝐴2 × 2)� + �𝐵1 + (𝐵2 × 2)� − (𝐶1 + (𝐶2 × 2))
�𝐷 10� �  
Constructing the formula in this manner will redefine a CEO as being overconfident 
only when (s)he has a net overconfidence mentions, meaning that (s)he has a higher 
mention of keywords signaling overconfidence than keywords signaling lack thereof.  
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3.4 Remarks Regarding chosen overconfidence variables 3.4.1. OC1: CEO Net Acquisition 
Many published articles measure overconfidence partly by using a proxy that reflects 
the CEOs personal projections of the outcome of the impending merger or acquisition. 
Malmendier & Tate measure this by observing how long a CEO holds his stock options, 
while Doukas & Petmezas used insider trading as a similar proxy.  
We chose to use our own version of the insider trading proxy for several reasons. As 
stated in section 1, the insider trading proxy more effectively compensate for the 
possibility of empire building through the CEO venturing his personal wealth by buying 
shares which could severely drop in price, compared to stock options which are 
relatively risk-free. Furthermore, since stock option remunerations were infrequent in 
Sweden during our time frame (as stated in section 1.3), the net acquisition of company 
shares is a better choice for this proxy. 
Doukas & Petmezas also pointed out several flaws with the option proxy that the insider 
dealings proxy does not suffer from. We already presented this criticism in section 1.3 
but examples include that the overconfidence measured from the holding of the options 
might be the overconfidence of an upcoming merger and not the merger at hand. 
Due to of the similarity of this study’s proxy with previously published articles, a 
comparison will be possible, as the output data will take on similar form, provided that 
overconfidence is a prevalent issue in Sweden. 3.4.2 OC2: Press Coverage 
Measuring overconfidence through a proxy for how a CEO is portrayed in public or 
how a CEO acts in public is a method used by published articles written by authors that 
we base a large portion of our work upon, namely Malmendier & Tate, Hayward & 
Hambrick and Brown & Sarma. 
The fundamental theory, as described in section 2.2, is that personality traits can be 
identified in common language and that the words used either by the observer to 
describe the person or the person himself talking about himself or his situation, can be 
used as a proxy for how overconfident this person is. 
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There is little difference between the proxy used by Malmendier & Tate, which they call 
“press coverage” and the proxy used by Brown & Sarma, which they call “Media 
praise”. Both proxies identify keywords in articles related to each CEO in their sample 
during their sample time. Our press coverage proxy is designed in the same way but 
utilizes a different calculation for deriving the overconfidence proxy. While Brown & 
Sarma compensates for some CEOs being mentioned more than others by dividing the 
data points by the number of articles, we included several other compensations as 
presented in section 3.1.  Similarly to OC1, the similarity of this proxy to previous 
published articles will enable us to compare results with other data sets.  
3.4.3 β1, Base Overconfidence 
The variable β1 in this study’s regression is explained as base overconfidence. This 
value is the inherent overconfidence value, as measured by our proxies, before the effect 
of our controlling variables, and is therefore termed as base overconfidence. This 
variable works under the simplifying assumption that there is a standard value of 
overconfidence that all overconfident managers share, which in turn is individually 
affected by external factors and unique circumstances.  
Null hypothesis 1, N1: There is no coherent base overconfidence value. 3.4.4 β2, CEO on Board of Directors 
Hayward & Hambrick theorized in their published article in 1997 that the vigilance of 
the board of directors is lower when the CEO is chairman of the board. Using their 
findings, we believe that the presence of the CEO on the board of directors will be 
enough to affect the boards’ decisions, including decisions regarding acquisitions. We 
chose to include this independent variable due to the legal difference between the USA 
and Sweden in regards to the CEOs position on the board. In Sweden, a CEO may sit on 
the board of directors but may not be elected chairman. Meanwhile in the USA one 
may, and usually is, both hold titles of CEO and as the chairman on the board of 
directors73. The variable is binary, taking the value 1 if the CEO has a director’s seat 
and 0 if (s)he is not present on the board of directors.  
                                                 
73 Denis, D. & McConnell, J., 2003, p. 2. 
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N2: CEO presence on the board has a negative or no correlation to observed 
overconfidence.  3.4.5 β3, Outsiders 
Hayward & Hambrick theorized in their article published in 1997, that the greater the 
percentage of insiders on the board of directors, the greater the amount of hubris the 
CEO has. Their results concluded that the greater the percentage of insiders was, the 
more the effects of hubris had on acquisitions. Fama & Jensen also conducted research 
on board composition, as described in section 2.3.3 in this article, and they found that 
outside board members have a higher incentive to monitor managers. 
We also chose to include outsiders on the board as an independent variable due to the 
difference between board composition between typical American and European boards. 
In general, US ownership is widely dispersed while European ownership consists of 
fewer, larger block holders74. As share ownership is dispersed in the US, the small stock 
owners have a low incentive to monitor the company by themselves, and due to this the 
free-rider problem and monitoring suffers. Adding this with the fact that CEOs may sit 
as chairman on the board, this results in fewer outsiders on the board of directors in U.S. 
companies75. As Europe has large block holders as owners, they have a larger incentive 
to exhaust resources to monitor the board of directors. This result in more outsiders on 
the board of directors in Europe compared to the U.S76.  
As mentioned earlier, the variable is constructed to take on a value between 0 and 1. 
The value is derived by calculating 𝑂𝑢𝑡𝑠𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑠
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐵𝑜𝑎𝑟𝑑 𝑀𝑒𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟𝑠.  
N3: Percentage of outsiders on the board of directors has a positive or no 
correlation to observed overconfidence. 
                                                 
74Enriques, L. & Volpin, P., 2007. 
75Denis, D. & McConnell, J., 2003, p. 2-4. 
76Ibid. 
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3.4.6 β4, Employee Representatives 
A Swedish law gives the employees of a company the right to appoint a minimum of 
employee representatives in a company's board of directors77. This variable will take on 
a value between 0 and 1, and similarly to the outsiders’ variable it is calculated as 
follows: 𝑊𝑜𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑟𝑠′𝑅𝑒𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑠
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐵𝑜𝑎𝑟𝑑 𝑀𝑒𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟𝑠 . 
N4: Percentage of employee representatives on the board of directors has a positive 
or no correlation to observed overconfidence.  
3.4.7 β5, Market-to-Book Value (M2B) 
We defined the book value of equity as the year end value of equity as described in each 
company's annual report for the year of the acquisition. We defined the market value of 
equity as the average number of outstanding shares times the stock price at the time, 
divided by the book value of equity.  
We theorize that a company with a larger market to book value will have a more 
overconfident CEO. Malmendier & Tate proves in their study that overconfident 
managers with cheap access to internal funds are more likely to perform acquisitions. 
When the market to book value is high, a CEO could utilize overpriced shares and use 
them as payment method for more mergers and acquisitions.  3.4.8 β6, Size 
Several published articles on overconfidence include size as a control variable including 
Malmendier & Tate and Brown & Sarma who reference Moeller, Schlingemann and 
Stulz which argued that agency problems and hubris in CEOs might be more common 
in larger companies78. This study will therefore include the size as well in order to 
enable comparison of results.  
                                                 
77PTK, Det säger lagen om styrelserepresentation, Retrieved 2013-03-28, 
<http://www.ptk.se/sv/Roller/Bolagsstyrelseledamot/Nyheter/Det-sager-lagen-om-
styrelserepresentation/> 
78Moeller, S., Schlingemann, F., & Stulz, R., ‘Firm size and the gains from acquisitions’, Journal of 
Financial 
Economics, 73, 2004, p. 201–228. 
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3.4.9 β7, Cash flow 
The third controlling variable in the regression is cash flow. This variable is defined by 
the year’s result as shown in the annual report with fiscal items such as depreciation 
added back. The reason to include this variable is that previous research has proven a 
correlation between available internal funds and overconfident acquisition behavior 
patterns. The annual result is also a proxy of how well the company is performing, and 
adding it will enable the regression to find one more explanation between difference 
between observed and base overconfidence.  3.4.10 β8, CEO Compensation 
We chose to include the CEOs salary and bonus compensation as a control variable. We 
defined CEO compensation as the sum of annual salary, performance bonuses and other 
remunerations that was paid out in cash or by other means to the CEO for the year when 
the acquisition was completed. We excluded all social payments such as pensions.  
This variable, too, was included in order to enable comparison to previous research. 
One publication which includes CEO remuneration is Hayward & Hambrick, where 
they found there was a correlation between CEO relative pay and acquisition premiums, 
one of their overconfidence proxies79.  3.5 Data Sources 3.5.1 Creating the M&A Sample 
We created the merger and acquisition data sample necessary for analyzing our proxies 
by extracting acquisition event information from Thomson Reuter’s software program 
Eikon. The M&A data criterion are based on Doukas and Petmezas’ sample criteria but 
differ on some occasions.  
The criteria for this study’s M&A sample are: 
1) The acquirer is a Swedish firm that was at the time publicly trading on the 
Stockholm stock exchange (Nasdaq OMX Nordic), or having a registered 
headquarter located in Sweden,  and have return data around the takeover 
                                                 
79Hayward, M. & Hambrick, D., 1997, p. 117. 
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announcement date on the “Thomson Reuters Eikon” Database and is marked as 
"Complete". 
2) The acquisition was completed between the dates 2000-01-01 and 2007-12-31. 
3) The acquirer purchases at least 50% of the targets shares as a result of the 
takeover within a time period of 6 months.  
4) The deal value of the acquisition is no less than one million dollars. This is to 
make sure that the acquisitions are not to include to small acquisitions which 
would not be made by overconfident CEOs. 
5) Financial and utility (e.g. power suppliers) companies are excluded from the 
sample as these firms can be considered to be regulated in their performance. 
This would probably affect our finding and distort the level of overconfidence.  
The data needed for the independent and controlling variables was collected manually 
from each company’s annual report for the year of the merger or acquisition. We 
defined an outsider as a person on the board that is not currently employed in that 
company and that is not a family member to the CEO, consistent with Brown & 
Sarma’s definition with the exception of the family ties80. The complete definition of 
outsiders and insiders can be found in section 1.5.1. To determine which board 
members that were outsiders, we investigated each company board member separately 
by reviewing board of director reports in financial reports collected through Retriever 
Business or the companies’ publications on their own web pages. In cases where 
complete detail of director’s employment and other assignments was not forthcoming, 
we manually researched the individuals in Thomson Reuter’s Eikon database, on 
Insynsregistret’s database, or on Retriever Business. 3.5.2 Creating the Media Coverage Sample 
Following Brown & Sarma we measured media coverage of the CEO as a variable for 
overconfidence81. For this purpose we used Retriever Monitor database and limit our 
scope to Affärsvärlden, Aftonbladet, Dagens Nyheter, Dagens Industri, Expressen, 
PrivataAffärer and Svenska Dagbladet. We selected these news presses as they can be 
                                                 
80Brown, R. & Sarma, N., 2007, p. 367. 
81Brown, R. & Sarma, N., 2007, p. 363. 
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considered leading business presses in Sweden. We then collected data on: (1) the 
number of articles. (2) Number of articles containing keywords listed in table 3.2. 
TABLE 3.2 – CATEGORIES FOR KEYWORDS IN OC2 PROXY 
Category A Category B Category C 
Självsäker 
Handlingskraftig 
Ambitiös 
Optimist 
Optimism 
Optimistisk 
Försiktig 
Praktisk 
Konservativ 
Konservativt 
Inte Självsäker 
Inte optimistisk 
Ansvarsfull 
Sparsam 
 
The timeframe for collecting the articles were three years prior to the first acquisition 
the CEO had performed during the timeframe 2000-2007. The string used when 
searching on Retriever Monitor is: 
”CEO_NAME” AND (självsäker or Handlingskraftig or ambitiös or optimist or 
optimism or optimistisk or försiktig or praktisk or konservativ or konservativt or 
ansvarsfull or sparsam) 
Following this we hand-checked the articles collected to ensure the keywords describe 
the CEO. 3.5.3 Creating the Net Acquisition Sample 
For the net acquisition sample we collected data on the net stock purchase for each CEO 
by using insynsregistret’s webpage. This webpage allowed us to gather data on the 
number of shares that a CEO purchased or bought during their time as a CEO. To find 
the value of the trades, we gathered data on stock price from by using Thomson 
Reuter’s DataStream software.  
As stated previously, net stock purchase is derived from the CEOs purchase and sales of 
the company’s stock during the timeframe of six months prior to the announcement of 
an acquisition and two months post the announcement of the acquisition. Only 
completed acquisitions and mergers are included in any sample. The timeframe of six 
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months prior and two months post acquisition was chosen to mirror the methodology in 
Doukas & Petmezas (2007). In this study they used a time-frame of 3 months prior and 
1 month post acquisition82. For this study we however doubled the timeframe both 
before and after acquisition, as we believed that this timeframe was too narrow to 
capture the overconfidence.  
Due to the time frame, some acquisitions will overlap which might result in purchases 
and sales of shares to be counted twice. We took into account that if two acquisitions 
done by the same CEO was in close proximity time wise, then we did not count his 
stock purchase twice. 
We defined stock purchase as the purchase of Swedish A or B shares. We did not 
include any kind of stock option in the net acquisition, as the proxy only use the 
investment or divestment in company stock. All other kinds of stock events such as 
splits or remuneration from company bonus programs were not included as they do not 
represent the CEO using his personal wealth to increase his risk exposure. Furthermore, 
we also included any purchase or sale of stock by the CEO which was then given to 
family members, as being a part of the sample since it is reasonable to believe that this 
net acquisition is in the CEOs personal interest.  
  
                                                 
82Doukas, J & Petmezas, D., 2007, p. 570.  
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4. Empirical Results 
This section starts with a presentation of the descriptive statistics, and then proceeds to 
present the results of the two regressions performed. This is followed by tests designed 
to examine the reliability of the data.  4.1 Descriptive Statistics 
When collecting our sample data following previously detailed methodology, we 
collected a sample of 375 acquisitions ranging over 8 years. The descriptive statistics of 
the full sample for the period of 2000-2005 is presented in table 4.1. 
TABLE 4.1 – DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS OF FULL SAMPLE 
  
CEO-
Board Outs 
Work-
Rep M2B 
Size 
(MSEK) 
CF 
(MSEK) 
CEOCom
p 
(MSEK) 
Board 
Members 
 Mean 0.76 0.80 0.09 6.58 35800 952 3.71 7.33 
 Median 1.00 0.83 0.00 1.25 1510 126 2.01 7.00 
 Maximum 1.00 1.00 0.57 127.98 2070000 33700 26.55 20.00 
 Minimum 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 22 -1070 0.00 2.00 
 Std, Dev, 0.43 0.17 0.15 19.18 244000 3530 4.91 3.07 
 Skewness -1.22 -1.52 1.43 4.93 8.17 8.01 2.85 1.25 
 Kurtosis 2.48 6.90 3.80 28.46 68.39 73.23 11.35 5.56 
 Jarque-
Bera 
26.78 104.90 38.22 2194.19 13628.56 22267.78 378.6 62.51 
 Probability 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
 Obs. 104 103 104 69 72 103 87 104 
 
The CEO presence on the board of directors was as can be seen in table 4.1 76%, which 
is decidedly higher as compared to the 45% of all Swedish listed companies. This 
strongly indicates a connection between CEO presence on the board of directors and 
acquisition frequency. Furthermore, as predicted, the number of outsiders on the board 
is higher compared to previous studies, with a mean of 80% outsiders, and a median of 
83%. Meanwhile, the mean for employee representatives is 9%, and a median of 0, 
suggesting that a majority of the boards do not have employee representation. From this 
we created one subsample where the there were indications of overconfidence from at 
least one of our two proxies. In order not to eschew the data, we have removed multiple 
acquisitions by the same CEO. The subsample instead consists of overconfident CEOs, 
rather than overconfident mergers and acquisitions.  The table 4.2 details the descriptive 
statistics of this subsample.  
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TABLE 4.2 – DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS OC1+OC2 
 OC1 OC2 
CEO-
Board Outs 
Work
-rep M2B 
Size 
(MSEK) 
CF 
(MSEK) 
CEOCom
p (MSEK) 
Board 
Member
s 
Mean 0.71 0.17 0.66 0.84 0.12 2.44 41100 2390 6.44 8.24 
Median 0.01 0.09 1.00 0.88 0.00 1.44 2590 536 4.07 8.00 
Maximu
m 26.35 0.77 1.00 1.00 0.57 12.83 219038 33700 27.58 15.00 
Minimu
m -10.08 0.00 0.00 0.33 0.00 0.11 86 -862 0.00 4.00 
Std. Dev. 3.36 0.21 0.48 0.13 0.15 2.81 225000 5410 6.06 2.35 
Skewnes
s 5.14 1.03 -0.69 -1.01 0.94 2.01 8.73 4.25 1.60 0.63 
Kurtosis 42.35 3.00 1.47 4.36 2.92 6.89 79.27 22.72 5.17 3.40 
Jarque-
Bera 
5927.7
0 15.08 15.14 21.08 12.70 112.39 21936 
1651.7
6 53.48 6.23 
Prob 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.04 
Obs 86 86 86 86 86 86 86 86 86 86 
 
From our data we find that approximately 66% of the CEOs in the overconfidence 
subsample sit on the board of directors.  Another point of interest is the fact that the 
mean of CEOBoard is higher in the full sample, as compared to the overconfidence 
sample, by ten percentage points. This is counterintuitive to this study’s hypothesis 1, 
which predicts that the CEO presence on the board of directors ought to be lower on the 
full sample, which contains the non-overconfident managers.  
The mean for the percentage of outsiders on the board is 0.84, meaning that 
approximately 84% of board members are outsiders in the subsample. When comparing 
to the full sample it is evident that the overconfidence subsample has four percentage 
point higher outsider presence, which is counterintuitive to this study’s second 
hypothesis. Employee representation is three percentage points higher in the subsample, 
which is counterintuitive to Hypothesis 3.  
When looking at the controlling variables, one can see by a quick ocular inspection that 
they are largely in line with previous studies’ findings. The size of the companies is 
slightly higher in the overconfidence subsample. Furthermore, the overconfident CEOs 
have access to markedly higher internal funds, measured through cash flows. The mean 
for CF is 151% higher in the subsample, and the median 325.4% higher. There is also a 
noticeable difference in CEO remuneration between the full sample and subsample. The 
average overconfident CEO has a 2.73 MSEK higher annual salary on average, and the 
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median overconfident CEO makes 2.06 MSEK more, a 102.5% increase. Market-to-
book ratio, however, is lower in the subsample. However, while the mean is lower for 
the subsample, the median is higher, suggesting the difference in the mean is due to 
outliers in the full sample. 
We chose to remove one outlier from the sample as we found it to be disruptive to the 
data. The outlier had an OC1 of 268 which disrupted the regression calculation for OC1. 
By removing the outlier the Jarque Bera test also improved for all variables.  
When collecting the data we noticed a pattern of negative correlation between the two 
proxies through ocular inspection. When proceeding to testing the correlation, we found 
this phenomenon to be true, as there was a negative correlation of -0.105 between the 
two samples, with a probability of 0.471. 
As the two proxies were meant to mirror the same trait in the CEO through different 
measurements, it is a very troubling finding to have negative correlation between the 
two. Our correlation can also be compared to Malmendier & Tates correlation between 
their longholder and media proxy, which is comparable to our net acquisition and press 
coverage proxy, which in their case resulted in a correlation of 0.10, which indicates 
that a positive correlation indeed is a possibility. The chosen method to cope with this is 
separating the two data sets to individually run two separate regressions and tests. This 
is in order to be able to analyze these results separately, and discern which, if any, of the 
two proxies properly describes overconfidence. These two final samples, which we used 
for our regressions and analysis, consisted of 49 observations in OC1, and 48 
observations in OC283. The regressions are as follows: 
R1: 𝑶𝑪𝟏 = 𝜷𝟏 + 𝜷𝟐𝑪𝑬𝑶𝑩𝒐𝒂𝒓𝒅 + 𝜷𝟑𝑶𝒖𝒕𝒔 + 𝜷𝟒𝑾𝒐𝒓𝒌𝑹𝒆𝒑 + 𝜷𝟓𝑴𝟐𝑩 + 𝜷𝟔𝑺𝒊𝒛𝒆 +
𝜷𝟕𝑪𝑭 + 𝜷𝟖𝑪𝑬𝑶𝒄𝒐𝒎𝒑 + 𝜺 
R2: 𝑶𝑪𝟐 = 𝜷𝟏 + 𝜷𝟐𝑪𝑬𝑶𝑩𝒐𝒂𝒓𝒅 + 𝜷𝟑𝑶𝒖𝒕𝒔 + 𝜷𝟒𝑾𝒐𝒓𝒌𝑹𝒆𝒑 + 𝜷𝟓𝑴𝟐𝑩 + 𝜷𝟔𝑺𝒊𝒛𝒆 +
𝜷𝟕𝑪𝑭 + 𝜷𝟖𝑪𝑬𝑶𝒄𝒐𝒎𝒑 + 𝜺 
                                                 
83 The two subsamples OC1 and OC2 can be found in Appendix 1 and Appendix 2 respectively. 
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4.2 Results of Regressions 
In this section the results of the regressions are presented. Two multivariate regressions 
were run on the two subsamples, both using OLS for estimations. An introductory 
ocular inspection of the regressions provides two observations. The first is the fact that 
no explanatory variable has statistical significance apart from the controlling variable 
CEOComp in the OC2 regression. Meanwhile none of our 3 hypotheses holds with 
statistical significance, the closest being Hypothesis 2 in OC2, with a Prob of 0.0730. 
The second observation is that the OC2 regression does provide a better explanatory 
power of the regression.  
TABLE 4.3 – REGRESSION RESULTS FOR OC1 PROXY, INSIDER TRADING 
OC1= β1+ β2*CEOBOARD+ β3*OUTS+ β4*WORKREP+ β5*M2B 
        + β6*CEOCOMP+ β7*SIZE+ β8*CF 
     
      Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     β1 0.141362 4.436372 0.031864 0.9747 
β2 1.447208 1.555692 0.930266 0.3577 
β3 2.147178 4.884612 0.439580 0.6625 
β4 0.245848 1.556058 0.157994 0.8752 
β5 -0.152412 0.509709 -0.299018 0.7664 
β6 -2.25E-07 2.02E-07 -1.113960 0.2718 
β7 6.53E-20 1.03E-18 0.063531 0.9497 
β8 6.14E-11 2.01E-10 0.305339 0.7617 
     
     R-squared 0.057346    Mean dependent var 1.480110 
Adjusted R-squared -0.103594    S.D. dependent var 4.061980 
S.E. of regression 4.267195    Akaike info criterion 5.888073 
Sum squared resid 746.5672    Schwarz criterion 6.196942 
Log likelihood -136.2578    Hannan-Quinn criter. 6.005257 
F-statistic 0.356320    Durbin-Watson stat 0.489238 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.922070    
     
     As can be observed in table 4.3, the explanatory power of the regression based on 
insider trading is severely lacking, with an F-statistic probability of rejecting the null 
hypothesis of 7.79%. Furthermore, R2 indicates that the independent variables only 
explain 5.73% of the changes in OC2. Only the CEOBoard coefficient is in line with 
our hypotheses, and none of the probabilities are statistically significant. These statistics 
indicate that there is a low correlation between the dependent variable and the 
explanatory variables.  
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The base overconfidence has a value of 0.14, as denoted by the β1 coefficient. However, 
there is statistical significance for the null hypothesis for this variable, indicating either 
that this figure is incorrect, or that base overconfidence is a variable, not a constant.  
The β3 and β4 both have positive coefficients as well as the second. This is not in 
accordance with the second and third hypothesis, which posited that outsiders and 
employee representatives would decrease observed overconfidence through monitoring. 
However, the probability of the null hypothesis being true for these variables is 66.7%, 
and 87.5% respectively. The first two controlling variables, M2B and CEOCOMP, have 
negative correlations with overconfidence. The null hypotheses for these two variables 
were that there is no correlation between observed overconfidence and the variables. As 
can be gleaned from an ocular inspection, the CEOCOMP variable has the highest 
probability of rejecting the null hypothesis in the regression, with a rejection likelihood 
of 27.2%. The last two variables, SIZE and CF, both have higher probability of the null 
hypothesis being true, with probabilities of 95.0% and 76.17% respectively.  
In table 4.4 an identical regression was run which instead uses the Media Coverage 
subsample. 
TABLE 4.4 – REGRESSION RESULTS FOR OC2 PROXY, MEDIA COVERAGE 
OC2= β1+ β2*CEOBOARD+ β3*OUTS+ β4*WORKREP+ β5*M2B 
        + β6*CEOCOMP+ β7*SIZE+ β8*CF 
     
      Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     β1 0.836855 0.261061 3.205588 0.0026 
β2 -0.001322 0.065480 -0.020184 0.9840 
β3 -0.510792 0.268626 -1.901498 0.0645 
β4 -0.085937 0.183808 -0.467539 0.6427 
β5 0.002971 0.008791 0.337952 0.7372 
β6 -1.07E-08 4.40E-09 -2.436869 0.0194 
β7 9.17E-14 1.48E-13 0.617993 0.5401 
β8 -2.53E-12 5.89E-12 -0.429657 0.6698 
     
     R-squared 0.256069    Mean dependent var 0.311898 
Adjusted R-squared 0.125881    S.D. dependent var 0.186843 
S.E. of regression 0.174688    Akaike info criterion -0.500621 
Sum squared resid 1.220633    Schwarz criterion -0.188754 
Log likelihood 20.01490    Hannan-Quinn criter. -0.382766 
F-statistic 1.966920    Durbin-Watson stat 2.015330 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.084126    
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When inspecting Table 4.4, an F-Statistic probability of 0.084 indicates that there could 
be statistical significance to the regression variables. However, the probability of the 
null hypothesis being true is too high to say this with confidence. Furthermore, base 
overconfidence, which is denoted as β1 in the regression table, is significant to the 
0.26% level. This variable corresponds to the CEO base overconfidence measured 
through the media. The mean for observed overconfidence, as shown in table 4.2, is 
0.71, indicating that external factors have lowered the observed overconfidence. This 
would indicate, as opposed to our results in OC1, that H2 and H3 carry a greater 
compared weight as compared to H1. The next variable, CEOBoard has statistical 
significance for the null hypothesis. This force us to discard H1, meaning there is no 
impact on observed overconfidence whether the CEO sits on the board of directors or 
not.  
One coefficient worth noting is 𝛽3,  and corresponds to Outs. The value of this 
coefficient is -0.510792, which would indicate that changing a board of directors to 
exclusively insiders to exclusively outsiders (which would change the value of Outs 
from 0 to 1) would lower CEO overconfidence by 61%. This means that Outs has a very 
strong impact on overconfidence, and would make adding outsiders to the board of 
directors an effective method of lowering observed overconfidence. Furthermore, the 
probability of the null hypothesis being discarded for this variable is 93,55%, meaning 
there is a strong indication, while not a statistical significance, that this hypothesis is 
true. With an increased sample it is possible that the results would improve to become 
statistically significant.  
Workrep, the final variable for this study’s hypotheses, also has a negative coefficient, 
which is in line with the hypothesis. However, in the case of this variable there is no 
statistical significance, with a probability of discarding the null hypothesis of 35.7%. 
Similarly, M2B showed a negligible impact on observed overconfidence through a 
coefficient of 0.0030.  
The only statistically significant variable was CEO Compensation, with a probability of 
rejecting the null hypothesis of 98.06%. The coefficient for this variable is 1.07 × 10−8, 
which means that for every MSEK of annual CEO compensation, overconfidence 
decrease with 0.0107. In our data sample CEO compensation ranged from 0 SEK to 
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27.584 MSEK, which would result in CEO compensation impact to be as high as 
0.2951. Finally, the two last controlling variables, Size and CF, showed little economic 
impact, with coefficient as low as 9.17 × 10−14.  4.3 Explanatory Properties of Regression models 
A test performed to ascertain the validity of the explanatory properties in the regression 
was a Variance Inflation Factors test, which test the regression for multicollinearity. 
The results of the tests are presented in table 4.5 and 4.6. 
TABLE 4.5 – VARIANCE INFLATION FACTORS TEST, OC1 
    
     Coefficient Uncentered Centered 
Variable Variance VIF VIF 
    
    β1  19.68140  52.96231  NA 
β2  2.420177  3.588606  1.611211 
β3  23.85944  47.25633  1.407547 
β4  2.421315  1.542452  1.223636 
β5  0.259803  2.784842  1.588745 
β6  4.07E-14  6.545872  3.045714 
β7  1.06E-36  1.274738  1.248723 
β8  4.05E-20  3.449499  2.915423 
    
     
 
TABLE 4.6 –VARIANCE INFLATION FACTORS TEST, OC2  
    
     Coefficient Uncentered Centered 
Variable Variance VIF VIF 
    
    β1  0.058243  91.11846  NA 
β2  0.004115  4.694567  1.271445 
β3  0.065871  76.75350  1.267394 
β4  0.004596  1.343834  1.112358 
β5  7.69E-05  2.749888  1.642195 
β6  1.97E-17  3.241586  1.408647 
β7  2.23E-26  3.218042  3.066118 
β8  3.34E-23  3.002133  2.458211 
    
     
The generally accepted critical value of the VIF is 10. As can be observed in table 4.5, 
and 4.6, this value is exceeded in two cases, β1, and β3 in both regressions, which 
corresponds to the variables base overconfidence, and outs. This would indicate there is 
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a multicollinearity issue with these two variables. This conclusion, however, does not fit 
with the regression models used, as the intercept, β1, is constant, whereas all other 
variables are not. Therefore in theory there can be no multicollinearity between the 
intercept and the independent variables. A solution to this is to instead use the centered 
VIF, which removes the issue. Centered VIF removes the intercept from the 
multicollinearity test, which results in only the independent variables being tested. 
Using the centered VIF is acceptable in cases where the intercept, in this paper base 
overconfidence, is constant, while the other xn factors are variables84. 
From the two subsamples we also performed two Jarque-Bera tests to test whether the 
sample data was normally distributed. Tables 4.7 and 4.8 present the results. 
TABLE 4.7 – JARQUE-BERA TEST, OC1    
OC1 CEOBOARD OUTS WORKREP SIZE M2B CF CEOCOMP 
 Skewness -0.205152 -1.113590  4.603537  6.783866  1.772781  4.753592  1.669721 
 Kurtosis  1.042088  4.332915  28.04257  47.02083  5.060448  28.21571  5.124589 
 Jarque-Bera  8.170283  13.75470  1453.464  4332.247  34.33360  1482.697  31.98424 
 Probability  0.016821  0.001031  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000 
 
TABLE 4.8 – JARQUE-BERA TEST, OC2 
OC2 CEOBOARD OUTS WORKREP SIZE M2B CF CEOCOMP 
 Skewness -1.031376 -0.648578  5.261694  6.466880  2.109529  3.303349  1.335015 
 Kurtosis  2.063736  3.138955  33.37091  43.80772  7.124686  13.74128  4.079465 
 Jarque-Bera  10.26307  3.403841  2066.268  3665.104  69.62698  318.0470  16.58860 
 Probability  0.005907  0.182333  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000  0.000250 
 
The null hypothesis in the Jarque-Bera test is that the residuals are normally distributed. 
Therefore, when the probabilities are low, as is the case in all, the probability of the data 
being normally distributed is low. The highest value, 0.182333, belongs to outs in the 
second proxy, OC2. This value however has only an 18% probability of being normally 
distributed. As normal distribution is a prerequisite for OLS, this data value lowers the 
reliability of the results. As the samples are 49 and 48 observations respectively, the 
results can likely be attributed to sample size. 
                                                 
84Gross, J., Linear Regression, Springer-Verlag, Berlin, 2003, p. 304. 
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Finally, robustness tests were performed on the two regressions. The first test was 
performed on OC1, where CEO remuneration was removed from the formula. The 
motivation for this was that we saw individual CEO wealth created outliers on the 
sample, which skewed the sample.  
TABLE 4.9 – ROBUSTNESS TEST ON OC1 
Included observations: 49   
OC1= β1+ β2*CEOBOARD+ β3*OUTS+ β4*WORKREP+ β5*M2B 
        + β6*CEOCOMP+ β7*SIZE+ β8*CF 
     
      Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     β1 -11205916 12479018 -0.897981 0.3744 
β2 7038671. 4429803. 1.588935 0.1198 
β3 16773672 13706782 1.223750 0.2280 
β4 7702.832 4168866. 0.001848 0.9985 
β5 -949601.1 1390322. -0.683008 0.4984 
β6 -0.120699 0.155017 -0.778617 0.4407 
β7 -9.09E-13 2.66E-12 -0.342106 0.7340 
β8 -7.54E-05 0.000388 -0.194433 0.8468 
     
     R-squared 0.069333 
F-statistic 0.436348 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.873542    
     
      
Removing the annual CEO compensation as a factor for overconfidence did improve the 
probabilities for base overconfidence, CEOBoard and Outs noticeably. However, the 
coefficient on base overconfidence is negative in this test, which is not in line with this 
study’s interpretation of the intercept. As base overconfidence is the inherent 
overconfidence in the CEO, it should be positive.  
The second robustness test was constructed by modifying the media coverage proxy 
formula as described in section 3.3. The results of the modified regression is presented 
in table  
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TABLE 4.10 – ROBUSTNESS TEST ON OC2 
Included observations: 38   
OC2= β1+ β2*CEOBOARD+ β3*OUTS+ β4*WORKREP+ β5*M2B 
        + β6*CEOCOMP+ β7*SIZE+ β8*CF 
     
      Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     β1 1.059622 1.051134 1.008074 0.3215 
β2 0.058238 0.248405 0.234449 0.8162 
β3 -0.366539 1.074860 -0.341011 0.7355 
β4 -0.023945 0.811546 -0.029505 0.9767 
β5 0.009354 0.033174 0.281954 0.7799 
β6 -3.33E-08 1.86E-08 -1.785603 0.0843 
β7 2.07E-13 5.54E-13 0.373144 0.7117 
β8 -8.13E-12 2.18E-11 -0.372591 0.7121 
     
     R-squared 0.130966 
F-statistic 0.645869 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.714700    
     
      
As can be noted the included observations decreased from 48 in the original regression 
to 38 on the robustness test. This decrease is attributed to the CEOs who has equal 
number of or higher number of mentions of keywords in column C compared to column 
A and B. With the modified OC2 formula this results in the value of observed 
overconfidence becoming 0 or negative, which per definition is not being overconfident. 
Noticeably is also the probabilities which has overall deteriorated, signifying low 
robusticity in the proxy formulation. 
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5. Analysis 
In this section we present an analysis of the empirical data presented in section four. 
The analyses performed are derived from the theoretical framework of published 
overconfidence articles as well as our own working hypotheses.     5.1 Analysis of Results 
As we observed that there is a negative correlation between our two proxies of 
overconfidence. We have no method of, with accuracy, discerning which of the two is 
the most apt to measure overconfidence with. When initially looking at the tests 
performed on the two regressions to discern the explanatory power of the regressions, 
we see little difference between the two. On the Jarque-Bera tests it was evident that 
neither of the samples were normally distributed, and on the multicollinearity test we 
could observe no multicollinearity when using the centered VIF method.  
Another method we used was measuring market reaction. Malmendier & Tate found 
that acquisitions stemming from overconfidence were met with a more negative reaction 
from the market, measured in share price in the days following the acquisition85. We 
measured these reactions in the samples by measuring the decrease or increase in share 
price between the day before the announcement of the acquisition, and three days post-
acquisition. This data show that the market reaction to acquisitions with overconfidence 
present is -0.23% in OC1 and in OC2 the market reaction is +0.92%. These numbers 
were calculated by calculated the share price change between 1 day before 
announcement, and 3 days post completion of the acquisition for every observation. 
From this the average change were calculated separately for the two proxies. In both 
cases there has been a weak reaction to both proxies. However, while OC1 is 
negatively, OC2 has had a positive reaction. This would indicate that OC1 is better 
suited for using as a proxy for overconfidence, as Malmendier & Tate found that the 
market reacted negatively to overconfidence-driven acquisition with an average share 
price decline of -0.9%86. However, there are some reservations to this hypothesis. The 
first reservation is the fact that there are a number of time gaps in the observations 
                                                 
85Malmendier, U & Tate, G., 2007, p. 34. 
86Ibid, p. 34. 
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between announcement and completion dates, which would enable a share price drift 
between the two share price observations which can be attributed to other factors apart 
from the acquisition. The second is that Malmendier & Tate and this study use samples 
from different countries and stock exchanges, and we have no evidence that the 
investors would react identically between the two. The final reservations is the 
difference in time spans of the two samples, where this study’s sample ranges from 
2000-2007, whereas the sample used by Malmendier & Tate ranges from 1980-1994. 
This makes time a possible explanation to the different results, as investor behavior, 
optimism and information asymmetry (which could worsen or dampen market 
reactions), could differ between the two time frames.  
Another method to discern which proxy most accurately captures overconfidence is to 
compare the usage of the two in the academic community. Here we found that the 
media coverage proxy has a much wider usage as compared to the insider trading proxy. 
Media coverage as a proxy to measure overconfidence is used in both Brown & Sarma 
and Malmendier & Tate as fundamental components of the papers. It is further used in 
Hayward & Hambrick, and the proxy itself is based on the widely accepted Five Factor 
Model, which gives it high credibility. Meanwhile, the insider trading proxy has 
exclusively been used in Doukas & Petmezas. Furthermore, in Doukas & Petmezas’ 
paper the insider trading proxy was not the major method of measuring overconfidence. 
Rather, this paper used acquisition frequency as a proxy, and later tested the hypothesis 
of insider trading on their results87. While they found the results to be correlated with 
statistical significance, this is the only occurrence of this proxy, giving it less weight.  
Finally, we performed ocular inspections of the results of the two regressions, to find 
which of the two proxies showed results most in line with our hypotheses. This study’s 
results clearly indicate that the media proxy is a far more accurate measurement for 
overconfidence. The results in the regression of OC1 showed little to no cohesion or 
systematic correlation between dependent variable and explanatory variables, and R2 
and Prob(F) also indicated this. This leads us to the conclusion that other motivators, 
such as signaling and board pressure, are far more important factors to insider trading 
                                                 
87Doukas, J. & Petmezas, D., 2007, p. 569-570. 
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activities. This compared to rational investment behavior which has a valuation bias 
based on overconfidence, which is the theory that is the basis for the construction of this 
proxy.  5.1.1 Analysis of OC1 
As mentioned earlier, the results in the first regression strongly indicated that OC1 is an 
inappropriate proxy for measuring overconfidence, at the least in its current form. R2 
was 0.057, indicating low explanatory power. The null hypotheses had a probability 
between 27 and 97.5% of being true, giving little credibility to the coefficient results. 
Furthermore, when performing a Jarque-Bera test on the results, we saw that the data 
was not normally distributed as the probability of the Jarque-Bera null hypothesis being 
true was 0.017 at the highest. This indicates that the data might not be normally 
distributed. However, considering that the size of the sample is 49, it is not outside of 
the conceivable that the data will normalize given a substantially larger sample. In 
section 5.2.1 we have further outlined the weaknesses of OC1 which explains why net 
acquisition might be unfit for use as an overconfidence proxy. The regression in the 
robustness test gave mixed results. While most of the probabilities to reject the null 
hypothesis improved, coefficient values deteriorated, with for example negative base 
overconfidence, and Outs coefficient being positive. We can therefore draw no 
conclusions as to the robusticity of the proxy. 
An analysis of our findings would be inappropriate, as the low sample size, non-
standardized data and low cohesion of results makes it impossible to find whether the 
non-results are due to the null hypothesis being true, or due to the low sample size 
giving inconclusive results. It would however be beneficial to research why our 
overconfidence proxy is unreliable while similar proxies for overconfidence, such as 
Malmendier & Tate’s stock option proxy, are not. We have therefore analyzed the 
correlation of Malmendier & Tate’s study with other research and theories such as 
monitoring and corporate governance, in order to ascertain the suitability of CEO 
personal investment patterns as a proxy for overconfidence. 
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Malmendier & Tate tested the correlation between longholders, the equivalent proxy to 
our proxy net acquisition, and different variables in their paper in 200788.  
TABLE 5.1- VARIABLE CORRELATION IN MALMENDIER & TATE STUDY 
 
Longholder Correlations 
Overconfident CEO/longholder 1.00 
Size -0.09 
Cash flow 0.10 
Net acq/Vested options 0.19 
Efficient board 0.04 
President & board member -0.02 
 
Malmendier & Tate found a negative correlation between size and overconfidence. The 
cash flow variable is positively correlated with overconfidence in Malmendier & Tate’s 
sample.  
The efficient board variable shows results of some interest. Malmendier & Tate’s 
findings are inconsistent with monitoring theory, and also inconsistent with our findings 
in our regression of OC2. A board with a higher degree of outsiders would increase 
monitoring, which in turn would reduce observed overconfidence. This cannot be 
observed in Malmendier & Tate’s study, indicating that the results may not be as 
appropriate in measuring overconfidence as previously stated.  
Both indicate that there is no correlation between the CEO acting as chairman, or even 
being present on the board of directors, and overconfidence.  
When inspecting the results of longholder correlation to CEO president and chairman 
multiple titles, there is an observed negative correlation with statistical significance. 
However, when looking at President & Board Member dual position in Malmendier & 
Tate’s descriptive statistics the results are comparable to other research, including our 
own. Malmendier & Tate’s finds no difference between the overconfidence sample and 
the full sample in the percentage the CEO is on the board of directors, alternative the 
percentage the CEO is president. Finally, when comparing to our second proxy, we find 
                                                 
88Descriptions for each variable can be found on page 29 in Malmendier, U & Tate, G., 2007. 
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a coefficient of -0.001, and a probability of 0.984, which strongly indicate that there is 
no correlation between CEO on the board of directors and overconfidence.  
This means that there likely is no correlation between this variable and overconfidence. 
However, when using the longholder proxy a correlation can be found. Further, this 
correlation shows a negative relationship, when it ought to be positive. This all indicates 
a problem in the proxy, and that it might incorrectly describe overconfidence. 
The net acquisition/vested options variable is positive and in line with both this study’s 
and Malmendier & Tate’s hypotheses. However, at the same time the majority of the 
variables are either contradicting other hypotheses, or are statistically insignificant, 
leading us to the conclusion that proxies constructed on the basis of acquisition patterns 
are inappropriate for observing overconfidence when used on their own.   5.1.3 Analysis of OC2 
While the regression results for the media proxy sample were markedly better compared 
to OC1, the tests performed on the regression put some doubt on the results. The Jaruqe-
Bera test indicated that the sample was not normally distributed. However, as noted 
with OC1, we are of the opinion that the main contributing factor to this is the small 
sample size. Furthermore, the probabilities in the test were slightly better compared to 
OC1, with a highest probability of being normally distributed of 18.2%, compared to 
OC1 1.7%. The robustness tests however showed a low robusticity in the proxy. When 
modifying the formula to instead have column C as a numerator, the results deteriorated 
to the point that all our hypotheses would have to be discarded. We can however see 
that this might be due to putting an unduly large shock on the proxy, as previous 
research all has used column C as a denominator. 
The two variables which proved most statistically significant were Outs and CEOcomp. 
In line with our hypothesis, outsiders had a negative impact on overconfidence. Less 
expected is the fact that the correlation between CEO compensation and overconfidence 
was found to be negative as well. We explain this with the CEO compensation 
increasing; a higher percentage of his wealth becomes tied to his employment, which 
would decrease his wealth diversification. As his risk exposure towards his employment 
increase, (s)he will strive to take measures to minimize this exposure. One measure 
would be to make less inherently risky investments, such as acquisitions. This results in 
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a lowered exercised overconfidence.  Therefore an increased remuneration effectively 
acts as a monitoring device for overconfidence.  While a high compensation might 
instill confidence in the CEO, (s)he will also be more careful to keep this salary.  
Neither CEOBoard nor Workrep showed any statistically measureable impact on 
overconfidence. In fact, our research resulted in statistical significance for the null 
hypothesis for CEOBoard, indicating that the CEO having a director’s seat has no effect 
on overconfidence levels. This is in line with Malmendier & Tate’s findings, where they 
observed no difference in overconfidence levels regardless of whether the CEO was 
both CEO and chairman of the board89. While this does not invalidate the research of 
Fama & Jensen, it would indicate that separating decision making and monitoring might 
have other impacts, such as directing company strategy and direction, and curtailing 
directly fraudulent behavior stemming from moral hazard, rather than affecting CEO 
overconfidence.  
The hypothesis for Workrep was that employee representatives would act as an internal 
monitoring device in addition to the external monitoring from outsider directors. 
However, could not be proven as no statistical significance could be discerned. This 
could be explained in a few ways. The first is the possibility that while actively 
monitoring, the employee representatives does not have the authority or managerial 
power to influence the CEO. The CEO might not feel that his career can be affected by 
union displeasure with him, and considers union actions such as striking a very low 
possibility, and therefore does not modify his behavior for them. Another possibility is 
that while being union representatives, they still feel pressure from the CEO, and are 
afraid that raising concerns or objectives might negatively affect their career, and 
therefore cannot effectively monitor the CEO. In a company where union presence is 
weak the representative might only be present on the board to follow regulation, and is 
not expected to provide input to the board of director’s work. The final possibility is the 
fact that the employee representative might simply not have the competence to spot 
overconfident behavior. An example is not being able to discern whether the CEO pays 
                                                 
89Malmendier, U & Tate, G., 2007, p. 27. 
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a too high premium in an acquisition, or not being able to gauge whether cash flow 
projections or future synergy benefits are being too optimistic or not.  
The study’s results give a strong indication that the most effective method of curtailing 
overconfidence in a CEO is monitoring through outsider directors. However, seeing as 
Swedish boards of directors are already largely compromised of outsiders, with a mean 
percentage of outside directors of 85%, increasing outsiders on the board does not seem 
an available solution to CEO overconfidence to most companies. 5.1.4 Geographical Differences 
From our data we have found that 86 out of the 375 observed mergers have had 
overconfident CEOs. However, if we are to find the approximate percentage of 
overconfident CEOs in Sweden based on our findings, we have to remove the sample 
data from OC1 as it is unreliable as well as count each CEO only once. This leaves us 
with 48 observed overconfident CEOs out of 248, which shows that about 19.4% of all 
CEOs in Sweden are overconfident.  Comparing our results with Malmendier & Tate’s 
research on longholders in the U.S.A. where they found that 188 out of 896 CEOs were 
longholders, resulting in an overconfidence level of 21%. In their publication with a 
British sample, Doukas & Petmezas’ research on multiple acquisitions found that 27.9% 
of all acquisitions consisted of multiple acquisitions. Therefore, we can posit that the 
overall level of overconfidence is lower in Sweden90, 91. We believe factor which has 
had the highest impact on these results are the high level of outsiders on the board of 
directors in Sweden.  
As explained in section 2.4.4, earlier studies have shown that the number of outsiders on 
the board is higher in Europe and lower in the U.S.A. We theorized in hypothesis 2 that 
a larger percentage of outsiders on the board would decrease observed overconfidence. 
As we have found indications of this in our regression, we can assume that the 
difference between the percentage of overconfident CEOs in Sweden and the U.K. is 
partly due to the lower percentage of outsiders in England's boards. Although the U.K. 
                                                 
90Malmendier, U & Tate, G., 2007, p. 32. 
91Doukas, J. & Petmezas, D., 2007, p. 540. 
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is a European country, it still has a widely held share ownership which is consistent 
with few outsiders on the board92.  
One factor that ought to be mentioned is the difference in time-frame between the 
studies. Our study looked at acquisitions in the time period of 2000-2007, whereas 
Malmendier & Tate used data from the period 1980-2004. As the oldest of the 
datapoints are more than 30 years old, the results may not be representative to the 
current situation in USA. One example of this is the changing trends in the board 
composition in the U.S. There is a clear trend of American boards moving towards the 
European model. This is evident in the 2012 Board Index report by Spencer Stuart. 
According to the report, the percentage of outsiders has increased, and the 
CEO/Chairman dual position is being less common, rather being replaced with 
independent chairmen93. This would indicate that monitoring and board vigilance is 
taking a more prominent role among the board’s tasks, which would indicate that 
overconfidence is on a declining trend in USA.   
The percentage of overconfident CEOs in the U.S. sample is very close to the 
percentage in our sample. While this is counterintuitive to our hypotheses and results, 
which indicate that there ought to be a larger gap between the two samples, it can be 
explained by other factors which weren’t included in the study. Examples of this are 
company culture, regulation and other forms of corporate governance, and leader 
characteristics. That this scenario is likely is evidenced by the R2 being 25.2%, meaning 
that a large majority of the external factors having an impact on observed 
overconfidence are still missing. Furthermore, all three studies use different methods for 
measurements overconfidence which makes our comparison between geographical 
overconfidence levels less reliable. 5.2 Weaknesses of the Study 
One evident weakness of the regression, which is also mirrored in the results, is the low 
number of data-points. As our regression used overconfidence as a dependent variable, 
our sample could only consist of acquisitions where overconfidence was observed. This 
                                                 
92 Enriques L. & Volpin P., 2007, p. 118. 
93 SpencerStuart, 2012, p. 10. 
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was only the case in 86 out of 375 mergers and acquisitions, 22.9% out of the full 
sample, and the process of measuring the proxies was a time-consuming and manual, 
limiting the sample size. Efforts to counteract this was adding two rounds of additional 
data, first acquisitions in 2006, and later in 2007, in order to acquire more observations. 
Unfortunately, the sample still was markedly smaller than was optimal, but time 
constraints made further gathering impossible. There also was the issue of the financial 
crisis in 2008-2009 to take into the consideration. The large macro economical shocks 
during this period would distort the results and it would be unclear whether acquisitions 
or insider trading would be the result of overconfidence or from the extraordinary 
market conditions during this period. Conversely, increasing the sample two years 
previous to our study would prove impractical as well. This is due to Retriever, the main 
database utilized for annual statements, did not provide statements or statistics previous 
to the year 2000.  5.2.1 Weaknesses of OC1 
The first weakness of overconfidence measured through insider trading is the 
discrepancy between theory and the real world. This proxy hinges on the fact that the 
CEO’s investment behavior is solely the product of rationality. It disregards many real 
life factors that could influence how the CEO buys or sells stocks in this company. The 
first of these is pressure from the board of directors and shareholders to purchase, or at 
least not sell, stocks in the company, due to the signaling effect. This might also be done 
to better align the interest of the CEO with the company’s welfare as the performance of 
the company now directly affects the CEOs welfare, much like stock option bonuses. A 
CEO purchasing stock would send a signal of belief in the company and a rising share 
price, and the CEO might be instructed to send this signal, perhaps even being funded to 
do so. Conversely, selling stock as the CEO might send a very negative signal, and the 
CEO may therefore be under instruction to keep shares even if (s)he personally would 
be inclined to sell. Another motivation for selling shares might simply be that the CEO 
needs liquid cash for a purchase, and much of his wealth was locked into shares through 
option remuneration programs. We believe that these factors are the main reasons for 
the low probabilities and correlation in the regression using this proxy, as we have no 
method to discern which transactions were due to overconfidence and which were due 
to other motivations, such as those mentioned above or others.  
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Another weakness of this proxy is the assumption that most of the CEO’s wealth is 
largely based on the remuneration from their CEO position. The independent variable is 
therefore based on the relationship between remuneration and investment behavior, in 
order to remove impact of CEO salary. However, this makes the variable susceptible 
from noise from independently wealthy CEO’s. An example would be a CEO who also 
is the founder and majority shareholder, whose wealth far surpasses that of his salary. 
The trading patterns of such individuals could surpass annual salary by 10 or even 100 
times, whereas most CEO’s insider trading is just a percentage of their salary. This 
creates extreme outlier values which likely skews the regression line.    5.2.2 Weaknesses of OC2 
One weakness we found in the proxy using media coverage was the bias towards large 
companies. On average our keywords indicating overconfidence had 2.08 hits per data-
point. Meanwhile, the average number of articles per data-point was 91.58 articles. This 
would mean that on average there was one mention of overconfidence every 44th article. 
When testing the correlation between number of articles and size of the companies, we 
found that there was a positive correlation of 0.08 between company market value and 
amount of articles covering the CEO. As the hits per article are very low, this would 
mean that smaller companies’ CEO would be less likely to be described as confident or 
optimistic simply due to the number of articles covering him. Another possible bias in 
article coverage is the fact that popular companies, or companies that are of public 
interest gets a higher number of articles. 
Another weakness with the very low number of average hits is the reliability in the 
results. The average hits of keywords indicating overconfidence was as mentioned 2.08, 
and they could only take on integers. This resulted in very low precision in the results, 
as just one additional mention of optimism or confidence when the current count was 1 
would essentially double the overconfidence value of the CEO.  
Furthermore, the fact that the proxy is based on certain keywords lowered the 
flexibility, and possibly the accuracy, of the proxy. There were cases where articles 
showed indications that the CEO might be overconfident, an example being him 
portraying his company in a better financial situation than observers or the market 
thought realistic, or the CEO having more positive or high projections of future earnings 
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compared to the market. However, in cases where these articles did not mention the 
keywords, they were not added to the proxy results. These results were intentionally left 
out in order to not bias results between companies where we read full articles and 
companies where we solely read the articles with the keywords in them. The only 
method to add these articles to the proxy would be to manually read the full sample of 
4,396 articles to find indications of overconfidence. This was not done for two reasons, 
with the first being that there simply was not sufficient time or resources to perform 
this. The second would be the issue of bias in interpretation of the article. Basing the 
results on what is perceived as overconfidence would bias the results with the Author’s 
own opinions of the CEO’s or companies. 
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6. Conclusion 
In this final section we summarize our conclusions drawn from the study. We also 
present suggestions for further research that we believe would be beneficial to the field 
of overconfidence. 6.1 Conclusion & Summary 
The current study examines CEO overconfidence surrounding mergers and acquisitions 
in Sweden. The purpose of the study was twofold; to ascertain if overconfidence was a 
prevalent issue in Sweden, which would suggest geographic location is not a factor in 
overconfidence, and to ascertain if differences in board composition would affect 
observed overconfidence.  
Three independent variables were chosen, CEO presence on board of directors, 
outsiders on the board of directors, and employee representatives on the board of 
directors. Controlling variables such as size and CEO compensation were also added to 
the regressions. Theory suggested that CEO presence would increase overconfidence, 
whereas outsiders and employee representatives would act as monitoring tools, and 
lower the observed overconfidence. The measure for overconfidence was constructed 
using two proxies, based on two different sets of data; one was based on media 
coverage, and the other insider trading with stocks.  
Our regression showed less unequivocal results as compared to previous research. The 
results for insider trading showed little to no coherent structure, and did not allow for a 
further analysis. It was hypothesized that other factors played a larger role in trading 
behavior rather than overconfidence. Meanwhile, media proxy indicated that, as 
hypothesized, outsider directors were a very effective means of curtailing 
overconfidence. The CEO presence on board of directors, and employee 
representatives’ variables did however not give any conclusive evidence of affecting 
overconfidence. One unanticipated result was the negative correlation between CEO 
compensation and observed overconfidence, calling for further research in the subject. 
By comparing the percentage of overconfident CEO’s present in our sample with 
similar studies, we have found a geographical difference in the level of overconfidence. 
This difference can be explained by the percentage of outsiders on the board as Swedish 
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companies have more outsiders on their boards compared to U.S. or U.K. boards. The 
difference in the level of overconfidence is largest between Sweden and the U.K., while 
there is little difference between American and Swedish overconfidence levels. 
However, it is unlikely these differences are due only to differences in outsiders, as 
there is both uncertainty in our regression results, and the explaining power of our 
chosen variables can only account for 25.2% of the changes in observed 
overconfidence.  6.2 Further Research 
One of the more interesting findings of this study is the negative correlation between 
CEO salary and CEO overconfidence. We found with statistical significance that an 
increase in CEO salary results in a decrease in observed overconfidence. This signifies 
that there is a connection between overconfidence and compensation. This study used a 
simple measure of remuneration, in form of total compensation excluding pension costs. 
However, we did not take into account different types of compensation plans, such as 
option bonus schemes compared to simple performance bonus. As the connection is 
now established between the two factors, we believe an interesting field of further study 
would be to compare the effects of different types of compensation, in order to study if 
certain types of compensation plans more effectively curtail overconfidence compared 
to others. 
Further study and research in a net acquisition proxy is also of interest. Previous studies 
on overconfidence support proxies based on the CEOs personal investment behavior in 
the company. Although Malmendier & Tate’s option proxy is widely accepted, we still 
see correlations that are incompatible with other research and empirical findings, such 
as monitoring. The same is true for our net acquisition proxy which proved to be 
insufficient in explaining overconfidence, which suggests that there are variables that 
are not being taken into consideration, or that the proxy itself is not properly 
constructed. We suggest that further studies are made on personal conditions for the 
CEO, such as the CEOs personal wealth, current financial situation or pressure from the 
board, which would make it possible to discern if the CEO is acquiring company shares 
due to overconfidence or for other reasons. 
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Furthermore, we still believe that there are various factors missing in explaining the 
difference between base overconfidence and observed overconfidence. This study 
focused mainly on board composition and active monitoring, but we believe that there 
are more factors affecting overconfidence. One potential example of such a factor is 
company culture, as there is a possibility that certain company cultures, perhaps cultures 
showing individualistic tendencies, might foster overconfidence while others dampen it. 
Another factor is company industry, as the overconfident manager might be more 
attracted to certain types of ventures.   
Interesting insights in CEO overconfidence might be found as well by performing more 
in depth study of a CEO showing clear signs of overconfidence. A personal thorough 
interview and analysis would provide the research field with a new data source, as all 
current research, including this study, has been striving to describe and measure 
personal traits with data, effectively studying from a distance. Data and insights from 
the primary source, the individual being studied himself, would likely provide new and 
interesting insights to how overconfident managers think, rationalize their actions and 
act. 
Finally, as explained there is a need for continuous study in the subject. There are trend 
changes in corporate governance systems and management styles, such as the American 
model putting bigger impact on corporate governance. This likely has been even more 
important in the wake of the global financial crisis of 2008. It would be of interest to 
perform a follow-up study to previously researched companies, in order to ascertain in 
what percentage of companies steps have been taken to moderate overconfidence, and 
which methods has proven most effective.  
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8. Appendix 8.1 Exhibit 1 - OC1 Subsample 
Ann. D. Compl. D. Target Acquirer 
Acquiring 
CEO 
CEO 
Board 
CF 
(MSEK) 
CEO 
Comp. 
(MSEK) OC1 
Size 
(MSEK) Workrep Outs M2B 
2-1-2000 4-14-2000 
Fastighets AB 
Balder Fabege AB 
Erik 
Paulsson 1 648,00 2,73 26,3545 3183,61 0,0000 0,8750 1,6167 
12-10-2001 1-25-2002 
AU-System 
Aktiebolag AB Teleca AB 
Nick 
Stammers 0 270,63 1,35 8,8502 1673,82 0,5000 0,6667 0,5199 
10-22-2007 12-11-2007 Academedia AB Bure Equity AB 
Mikael 
Nachemson 0 1146,30 4,70 5,1917 2660,14 0,0000 1,0000 1,0324 
6-15-2001 9-5-2001 
Halsokostcentralen 
AB (HKC) 
Wilh Sonesson 
AB 
Greg 
Dingizian 1 ,04 ,55 5,0737 99,61 0,0000 0,8889 4,4356 
11-8-2005 12-1-2005 
Fastighets AB 
Centralposthuset Peab AB 
Mats 
Paulsson 1 1192,00 5,45 4,3704 2768,47 0,5000 0,9091 1,2093 
8-26-2005 8-26-2005 
Building rights on 
Ulriksdalsfalt 
together with part of 
property Jarva 4:11 Peab AB 
Mats 
Paulsson 1 1192,00 5,45 3,9798 2528,68 0,5000 0,9091 1,3240 
10-31-2007 10-31-2007 
property Apotekarn 
22 Fabege AB 
Christian 
Hermelin 1 1818,00 2,16 3,9284 13286,00 0,0000 0,5000 0,8592 
11-9-2005 11-24-2005 
CAD-Quality i 
Sverige AB Addnode AB 
Bo 
strandberg 0 68,45 ,71 3,1128 386,50 0,0000 1,0000 1,0288 
3-12-2007 3-12-2007 
IVM Automotive 
Holding GmbH & 
Co, KG Semcon AB Henrik Sund 0 314,80 1,10 2,5114 982,49 0,4286 0,7000 0,4104 
3-17-2004 5-21-2004 Parere AB 
WM-Data Nordic 
AB 
Crister 
stjernfelt 0 462,60 3,46 1,9038 7690,31 0,5714 1,0000 0,3271 
11-9-2006 11-9-2006 Plus4You Proffice AB 
Lars 
Wahlström 0 70,00 3,45 1,1870 1406,81 0,2857 1,0000 0,2303 
9-13-2000 11-1-2000 Arete Ab Turnit Ab 
Peter 
Enström 1 139,67 3,49 0,7081 3044,24 0,0000 0,8333 0,4328 
3-29-2007 4-2-2007 
Vitalas International 
AB 
Midelfart 
Sonesson AB 
(Midsona) 
Lennart 
Nylander 0 -287,00 1,06 0,6234 3607,14 0,0000 0,8333 0,1383 
12-19-2005 12-19-2005 
3 properties in 
Norrahammar and 
Granna Kungsleden AB Jens Engwall 1 3657,59 5,19 0,5717 1223,59 0,0000 0,8333 5,4340 
12-5-2007 12-5-2007 Lost Boys NV 
LBI International 
AB Luke taylor 0 162,00 5,31 0,5045 2158,20 0,0000 1,0000 0,9355 
1-9-2007 1-9-2007 
Nordic Modular 
Holding AB Kungsleden AB 
Thomas 
Erseus 1 2406,30 7,49 0,3909 9991,95 0,0000 0,8750 0,9047 
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6-1-2007 6-1-2007 
E,ON Bredband 
Sverige AB Tele2 AB 
Lars-Johan 
Jarnheimer 0 2491,00 14,70 0,3797 51380,33 0,0000 1,0000 0,5226 
7-7-2006 7-7-2006 Business Assets Sandvik AB 
Lars 
Pettersson 1 10883,00 12,05 0,3711 96102,16 0,2222 0,9000 0,2830 
1-23-2007 1-23-2007 Leta AB Eniro AB publ 
Tomas 
Franzén 1 2043,00 7,43 0,3193 284414,40 0,5000 0,6000 0,0143 
2-20-2001 2-20-2001 
Frontec Research & 
Technology AB Sigma AB Sune Nilsson 1 -,21 1,59 0,2706 2039,74 0,3333 0,6667 0,0997 
11-19-2004 2-15-2005 Ainax AB Scania AB Leif Östling 1 7992,00 15,33 0,2321 12320,00 0,2857 0,9333 1,7086 
4-23-2001 4-23-2001 Datorex Nova AB Sigma AB Sune Nilsson 1 -,21 1,59 0,2003 1510,26 0,3333 0,6667 0,1347 
10-25-2005 11-7-2005 
Technology Nexus 
AB's business in 
Borlange Know IT 
Anders 
Nilsson 0 37,21 2,31 0,1999 530,08 0,0000 0,8333 0,3914 
9-7-2005 9-7-2005 
Akelius Fastigheter's 
three properties in 
Gavle, plus one 
property in Vasteras Fast Partner 
Sven-Olof 
Johansson 0 323,00 ,96 0,1712 1471,69 0,0000 1,0000 0,8014 
2-1-2000 2-1-2000 
Hotellus 
International Ab Pandox AB 
Anders 
Nissen 0 229,56 1,97 0,1498 1655,85 0,0000 1,0000 1,0112 
1-14-2002 1-14-2002 Frantextil AB 
New Wave Group 
AB 
Torsten 
Jansson 1 36,85 3,48 0,1434 275,14 0,0000 0,7500 1,8581 
9-25-2006 4-2-2007 
Komatsu Zenoah's 
outdoor power 
products operation Husqvarna AB 
Bengt 
Andersson 1 2740,00 9,62 0,1249 20111,85 0,2000 0,9091 0,3674 
9-26-2007 9-27-2007 Objectnet AS Know IT AB 
Anders 
Nilsson 0 82,07 3,83 0,1108 753,99 0,0000 0,8333 0,4419 
10-25-2005 1-24-2006 
Marconi's 
telecommunications 
equipment and 
international 
services businesses 
Telefon AB LM 
Ericsson 
(ericsson) 
Carl-Henrik 
Svanberg 1 33680,00 24,04 0,1056 20724,71 0,1667 0,9231 5,8334 
2-5-2007 5-31-2007 Dynapac AB Atlas Copco AB 
Gunnar 
Brock 1 9269,00 18,04 0,0926 111506,47 0,6667 0,3333 0,1313 
5-15-2007 5-15-2007 Commercial property Castellum AB 
Håkan 
Hellström 0 2006,00 3,50 0,0568 16564,00 0,0000 1,0000 0,6764 
4-29-2002 7-1-2002 Besam AB Assa Abloy AB 
Carl-Henric 
Svanberg 1 1058,50 15,60 0,0513 46837,50 0,6667 0,6667 0,0289 
5-15-2002 5-15-2002 Slatta Damm AB Drott AB Mats Mared 1 1155,00 3,06 0,0384 1797,18 0,0000 0,7500 3,4398 
12-18-2007 12-23-2007 Plenware Group Oy 
Cybercom Group 
Europe AB 
Patrik 
Boman 0 67,03 1,75 0,0349 235,34 0,3333 0,7500 3,0103 
2-19-2001 5-3-2001 Atle Ab 
Woodrose Invest 
AB (ratos ab) 
Arne 
Karlsson 
(Ratos) 1 2589,00 4,58 0,0304 1469,41 0,0000 0,8889 5,4539 
3-21-2007 6-8-2007 Spits ASA A-Com AB 
Fredrik 
Sandelin 0 6451,00 3,73 0,0254 168,31 0,0000 1,0000 1,4318 
1-19-2006 1-25-2006 Ingemansson Angpanneforenin Jonas 0 165,85 3,97 0,0209 899,36 0,2857 0,7778 1,2137 
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Technology AB gen AB (AF) Wiström 
9-10-2007 9-10-2007 BBM-Verktyg AB 
Investment AB 
Latour 
Jan 
Svensson 1 1030,00 3,99 0,0208 10873,00 0,0000 0,8750 0,9326 
10-29-2007 11-15-2007 
TotalTelefoni 
Svenska Invest AB Mobyson AB Bent Brugård 0 -52,76 5,38 0,0197 192,20 0,0000 1,0000 1,1681 
9-6-2007 10-19-2007 
Seguridad Cono Sur 
SA Securitas AB 
Alf 
Göransson 1 1974,00 10,40 0,1400 26579,94 0,1000 0,9091 0,3316 
8-29-2005 8-29-2005 Kanoten 7 Klovern AB 
Gustav 
Hermelin 1 380,48 2,24 0,0131 2840,60 0,0000 0,6250 0,7971 
6-21-2006 6-21-2006 Combra AB 
Angpanneforenin
gen AB 
Jonas 
Wiström 0 165,85 3,97 0,0120 1041,79 0,2857 0,7778 1,0477 
2-26-2007 4-11-2007 
ABBA Linear Tech 
Co Ltd SKF AB 
Tom 
Johnstone 1 6543,00 11,61 0,0118 57060,04 0,4000 0,7143 0,3217 
2-8-2006 7-31-2006 Trio AB 
Teligent AB 
(SWE) Tomas Duffy 0 -92,00 2,30 0,0096 477,21 0,0000 1,0000 0,7345 
7-4-2007 7-4-2007 Medifact AS Proffice Care AB 
Lars 
Wahlström 0 106,00 2,97 0,0094 1499,90 0,1667 1,0000 0,3047 
10-17-2001 10-17-2001 
commercial property 
in Vasteras and 
Malmo Castellum 
Lars-Erik 
Jansson 1 534,00 3,25 0,0081 1128,79 0,0000 0,8333 3,4045 
3-27-2003 5-14-2003 Respons AB Eniro AB 
Lars 
guldstrand 0 648,00 17,96 0,0072 10043,85 0,2500 1,0000 0,2836 
5-9-2006 9-6-2006 JC AB 
rnb Retail and 
Brands AB 
Mikael 
Solberg 1 337,91 2,07 0,0030 346,58 0,0000 0,8889 4,5161 
5-8-2000 9-30-2000 Folkebolagen Ab Lindab AB 
Carl-Gustaf 
Sondén 1 373,00 4,24 0,0014 2232,00 0,2857 0,7778 0,5856 
 
 
 
 
 
 
72 
 
 
8.2 Exhibit 2 – OC2 Subsample 
Ann. D. Comp. D. Target Acquirer 
Acq. 
CEO 
CEO-
Board 
CF 
(MSEK) 
CEOComp 
(MSEK) OC2 Size 
Work-
rep Outs M2B 
8-20-2007 9-1-2007 Bysted A/S Intellecta AB 
Richard 
Ohlson 1 49,90 1,79 0,3333 251,23 0,0000 0,8571 1,6344 
5-16-2006 5-16-2006 
NextGenTel Holding 
ASA TeliaSonera AB 
Anders 
Igel 0 30486,00 9,59 0,0877 200094,77 0,3000 1,0000 1,5667 
6-14-2006 6-14-2006 
Hemtex's 24 
franchised shops Hemtex AB 
Anders 
Jansson 0 151,11 2,68 0,1754 1902,38 0,0000 1,0000 4,7796 
6-14-2006 6-14-2006 Jotul AS Ratos AB 
Arne 
Karlsson 1 3328,00 18,30 0,1807 8231,79 0,0000 0,8750 0,6968 
5-29-2006 8-1-2006 
Valkyries Petroleum 
Corp 
Lundin 
Petroleum Ab 
Ashley 
Heppenst
all 1 1571,17 5,32 0,5797 22293,56 0,0000 0,8571 2,1096 
5-7-2001 5-7-2001 
Ericsson Saab 
Avionics AB Saab AB 
Bengt 
Halse 1 2307,00 7,67 0,2151 9261,99 0,1667 0,8333 1,3867 
1-26-2007 3-30-2007 
Moelnlycke Health 
Care AB Investor AB 
Börje 
Ekholm 1 -367,00 16,18 0,1067 130036,17 0,0000 0,7000 0,8378 
4-29-2002 7-1-2002 Besam AB Assa Abloy AB 
Carl-
Henric 
Svanberg 1 1058,50 15,60 0,4301 47479,68 0,4444 0,6667 3,8348 
10-25-
2005 1-24-2006 
Marconi's 
telecommunications 
equipment and 
international 
services businesses 
Telefon AB LM 
Ericsson 
(ericsson) 
Carl-
Henrik 
Svanberg 1 33680,00 24,04 0,2913 2072470,50 0,1538 0,9231 17,1427 
3-17-2004 5-21-2004 Parere AB 
WM-Data Nordic 
AB 
Crister 
stjernfelt 0 462,60 3,46 0,1124 7690,31 0,5714 1,0000 3,0574 
6-26-2006 8-25-2006 
Beacon Holdings 
Corp 
Atlas Copco 
North America 
Inc 
Gunnar 
Brock 1 17010,00 13,80 0,0820 45380,97 0,2000 0,9000 1,3875 
12-21-
2001 12-21-2001 
Real estate property 
in Gothenburg Wallenstam AB 
Hans 
Wallensta
m 1 96,90 2,68 0,3571 85,75 0,0000 0,7143 0,1365 
1-9-2007 1-9-2007 Playahead AB 
Modern Times 
Group MTG AB 
Hans-
Holger 
Albrecht 0 1354,00 27,58 0,1449 27389,66 0,0000 0,8750 4,6621 
5-15-2007 5-15-2007 Commercial property Castellum AB 
Håkan 
Hellström 0 1487,52 3,50 0,4762 17372,68 0,0000 1,0000 11,6790 
8-14-2003 10-9-2003 
Siemens LSS (Life 
Support Systems) 
Getinge 
Industrier AB 
(getinge ab) 
Johan 
Malmquist 1 1400,50 7,61 0,6897 11052,01 0,3636 0,5455 3,1305 
8-11-2006 8-31-2006 
Property in 
Kungsangen JM AB 
Johan 
Skoglund 1 1587,00 5,29 0,3448 9877,55 0,2222 0,8889 2,7514 
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6-9-2006 6-9-2006 Tribotec AB Indutrade AB 
Johnny 
Alvarsson 1 378,00 4,48 0,2273 3640,00 0,0000 0,8750 4,0807 
1-19-2006 1-25-2006 
Ingemansson 
Technology AB 
Angpanneforeni
ngen AB (AF) 
Jonas 
Wiström 0 165,85 3,97 0,3774 899,36 0,2222 0,7778 0,8239 
8-27-2007 8-27-2007 
Guardian Armored 
Security Inc Loomis AB 
Lars 
Blecko 1 -862,30 12,38 0,1754 N/A 0,0000 1,0000 N/A 
11-20-
2001 12-17-2001 
Scandinavia Online 
AB Eniro AB 
Lars 
Guldstran
d 1 538,00 4,90 0,4762 13565,93 0,0000 0,8750 2,7257 
7-7-2006 7-7-2006 Business Assets Sandvik AB 
Lars 
Pettersso
n 1 10883,00 12,05 0,0685 96102,16 0,2000 0,9000 3,5334 
9-23-2005 3-6-2006 Tranter PHE Inc Alfa Laval AB 
Lars 
renström 1 2326,40 6,67 0,2222 3840,25 0,3333 0,5833 0,5622 
6-15-2007 6-15-2007 MobilEyes AB 
HiQ International 
AB 
Lars 
Stugemo 1 139,40 6,50 0,1923 1633,86 0,1250 0,7500 3,7869 
11-9-2006 11-9-2006 Plus4You Proffice AB 
Lars 
Wahlströ
m 0 70,00 3,45 0,2703 1406,81 0,2857 1,0000 4,3420 
3-20-2000 6-14-2000 Diligentia Ab 
Skandia Liv AB 
(scandia,se) 
Lars-Eric 
Petersson 1 3283,00 6,00 0,0746 219038,10 0,0000 0,9000 10,5566 
6-30-2006 8-1-2006 
E,ON Bredband 
Sverige AB Tele2 AB 
Lars-
Johan 
Jarnheim
er 1 67,00 14,40 0,1504 32003,25 0,0000 0,8889 1,0989 
3-17-2003 8-12-2003 
Kommersiella 
Fordon AB (KFAB) Volvo AB 
Leif 
Johansso
n 1 8702,00 26,55 0,0569 11567,85 0,3333 0,9333 0,1358 
11-19-
2004 2-15-2005 Ainax AB Scania AB 
Leif 
Östling 1 7992,00 15,33 0,1897 12320,00 2,6667 0,9333 0,5853 
8-26-2005 8-26-2005 
Building rights on 
Ulriksdalsfalt 
together with part of 
property Jarva 4:11 Peab AB 
Mats 
Paulsson 1 1192,00 5,45 0,2857 2528,68 0,4545 0,9091 0,7553 
4-26-2004 8-27-2004 Custos AB 
Investment AB 
Oresund 
Mats 
Qviberg 1 636,67 1,59 0,1775 2007,04 0,0000 0,8000 0,5168 
2-8-2006 2-8-2006 TH Kristiansen AS PartnerTech AB 
Mikael 
Jonsson 1 174,15 6,26 0,7692 1437,48 0,1250 0,8750 2,4006 
10-21-
2005 11-17-2005 
Skandinaviskt 
Herrmode AB 
rnb Retail and 
Brands AB 
Mikael 
solberg 1 59,54 1,46 0,1389 207,05 0,1250 0,8750 0,8150 
10-8-2007 11-28-2007 NovAtel Inc Hexagon AB 
Ola 
Rollén 1 2614,00 13,11 0,0833 28418,98 0,0000 0,8000 2,8289 
1-31-2007 1-31-2007 
Sommer Corporate 
Media GmbH & Co, 
KG 
Elanders 
Kommunikation 
AB 
Patrick 
Holm 1 267,27 4,10 0,4762 1293,05 0,1000 0,8000 1,4956 
6-20-2005 10-25-2005 HQ Fonder AB 
Hagstromer & 
Qviberg 
Patrik 
Enblad 1 103,00 1,35 0,5882 92,93 0,0000 0,8750 0,1062 
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9-7-2007 10-10-2007 Marianne Morris AS 
Wedins Skor & 
Accessoarer AB Per thelin 0 5,00 3,65 0,2439 N/A 0,2857 0,7143 N/A 
2-24-2006 2-24-2006 
Norrportens real 
estate portfolio Vasakronan AB 
Per-
Håkan 
Westin 0 3834,00 1,17 0,6250 N/A 0,2857 0,7143 N/A 
11-22-
2005 11-22-2005 
The Sandbacken 
property Ap Fastigheter 
Per-
Håkan 
Westin 1 3118,00 2,90 0,5882 N/A 0,0000 0,8571 N/A 
2-17-2006 2-27-2006 Combursa Cardo AB Peter aru 1 621,00 4,98 0,3226 6870,00 0,2727 0,9091 2,3007 
11-2-2006 11-1-2006 Reflex Software Ltd Protect Data AB 
Peter 
Larsson 1 114,04 1,25 0,4348 3788,95 0,0000 0,8000 12,8257 
12-6-2001 12-6-2001 
11 Airport Related 
Properties 
NORDISK 
RENTING 
Reinhold 
Geijer 0 511,42 4,67 0,2128 N/A 0,0000 1,0000 N/A 
4-12-2000 6-15-2000 
Provobis Hotel & 
Restauranger Ab 
Scandic Hotels 
AB 
Roland 
Nilsson 1 854,50 3,90 0,3571 6207,25 0,1250 0,7500 3,2855 
12-22-
2004 4-1-2005 Turnit Ab Nocom AB 
Stefan 
Skarin 1 30,29 1,19 0,4348 712,69 0,0000 0,8000 11,5032 
5-17-2006 5-17-2006 
Kemira's paint 
factory in Stockholm Skanska AB 
Stuart 
Graham 1 4802,00 16,62 0,3571 50554,84 0,2500 0,7500 2,6144 
12-7-2001 12-7-2001 
NetAssist 
International AB 
Dimension AB 
(proact IT) 
Sven 
Uthorn 0 -7,59 1,77 0,4167 693,70 0,0000 1,0000 5,9201 
9-7-2005 9-7-2005 
Akelius Fastigheter's 
three properties in 
Gavle, plus one 
property in Vasteras Fast Partner 
Sven-Olof 
Johansso
n 0 323,00 ,96 0,2041 1471,69 0,0000 1,0000 1,2478 
4-6-2006 4-6-2006 
Macrotech Polyseal 
Inc SKF AB (skf inc) 
Tom 
Johnstone 1 6266,00 9,66 0,6667 52369,93 0,0000 0,8000 2,6710 
2-8-2006 7-31-2006 Trio AB 
Teligent AB 
(SWE) 
Tomas 
Duffy 0 -92,00 2,30 0,5000 477,21 0,0000 1,0000 1,3615  
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Denna artikel skrivs som en artikel i DI, med dess läsare som målgrupp.  
Var femte VD låter sig styras av hybris. 
Bilden av den Svenska riskaverse VD:n till trots har VD-hybris påvisats som en faktor i en 
femtedel av svenska företagsförvärv 2000-2007. Och en av de effektivaste metoderna att 
kontrolera chefens övermod – ge honom högre lön. 
Mellan åren 1980 och 2001 förstördes cirka 226 miljarder USD i aktieägarvärde genom 
företagsuppköp och mergers – bara i USA. Detta till trots är uppköp en vanligt förekommande 
strategi där företagsledare söker en snabbare tillväxt eller värdeskapande genom synergier. En 
förklaring till detta fenomen är hybris. Studier har visat att hybris hos VD:n är en bakomliggande 
faktor i upp till 30 % av företagsförvärv. Hybris tar form genom att VD:n tror på en så kallad 
”bättre-än-medel-effekt”, där han har en överdriven tilltro till sin egen förmåga att skapa värde, 
öka kassaflöden och skapa synergier. Han ser därigenom fler uppköpsmöjligheter, och är beredd 
att betala högre premier på aktiepris.  Marknaden i sin tur delar inte nödvändigtvis VD:ns 
avkastningsförväntningar, och en bevisat negativ aktiepriseffekt har blivit påvisad när uppköpet 
drivs av hybris. Malmendier & Tate visade i en artikel från 2007 att marknadens negativa reaktion 
är dubbelt så hög i den här typen av uppköp.  
Då hybris är ett påvisat fenomen som kan ha starkt negativa effekter för ett företag, blir det av 
vikt att kontrollera och minska den. I vår studie har vi undersökt VD-hybris i 375 Svenska 
företagsförvärv. Vi hade två syften med detta; det första var att undersöka dess förekomst bland 
Svenska verkställande direktörer. Detta då tidigare studier främst undersökt direktörer i USA och 
England, och möjligheten finns att hybris är en effekt av specifikt geografiska faktorer. Det andra 
syftet var att kontrollera vilka externa faktorer som kunde påverka VD:ns övermod. Målet var att 
hitta metoder för ett företag att kontrollera direktörers hybris, och säkerställa att hans handlingar 
är i företagets och dess intressenters intresse.  
Vi valde att främst fokusera på styrelsesammansättning. VD:n svarar till styrelsen, och det är de 
som har i uppdrag att övervaka och kontrollera hans agerande och investeringar. Vi hade därför 
anledning att tro att styrelsens sammansättning är ett viktigt instrument att kontrollera hybris. Vi 
valde att fokusera på tre faktorer i styrelsen. (1) Huruvida VD:n även sitter i styrelsen. (2) Andelen 
styrelsemedlemmar som kan klassificeras som outsiders. Med outsiders menar vi 
styrelsemedlemmar som ej är anställda på företaget i fråga, utan har en oberoendeställning. (3) 
Andelen fackmedlemmar eller arbetstagarrepresentanter på styrelsen.  
Hybris uppmättes genom hur VD:n avbildas i tidsskrifter genom egna uttalanden eller 
journalisternas åsikt, och en förekomst av hybris kunde uppvisas i 19.4% av undersökta 
verkställande direktörer. I den efterföljande analysen kunde ett starkt negativt samband mellan 
hybris och outsiders påvisas. Det innebär att ju högre andel outsiders på styrelsen desto lägre 
övermod hos VD:n, och det förklaras med att outsiders har andra incitament än en insider, och 
värdesätter sitt anseende, medan en insider kan känna sig pressad att vara VD:n till lags. 
Däremot kunde inga effekter påvisas av VD:ns närvaro på styrelsen, och även 
fackmedlemsnärvaro visade sig vara ett ineffektivt medel att motverka hybris.  
Även ett antal ytterligare variablers effekt på hybris testades, och ett överraskande resultat var 
att det finns ett starkt samband mellan hybris och VD:ns ersättning. Ett negativt samband.  
Analysen visade att ju högre ersättning en VD har, desto mindre hybris kunde påvisas. Vi 
förklarar detta med att när VD:ns ersättning ökar, blir hans förmögenhet mindre diversifierad – 
hans beroendeställning till företaget ökar. På grund av detta blir han mer försiktig i sina 
bedömningar, till exempel i potentiella synergier och risker.  
Den Amerikanska VD:n är stereotypiskt ansedd självsäker och riskhungrig – och mycket riktigt 
är VD-hybris vanligare förekommande i USA. Men det är Britterna som har visat sig vara de mest 
självsäkra, med en uppmätt hybris i 29.7% av företagsförvärv. De låga siffrorna i Sverige kan 
förklaras med att Sverige har en av världens högsta andelar outsiders på styrelsen – vi uppmätte 
ett genomsnitt på 84% outsiders. Trots att det är den effektivaste metoden att motverka hybris, 
blir det dock problematiskt att öka andelen outsiders på den svenska styrelsen då den redan är 
hög. Därmed kan en löneökning vid tillfällen när chefen ter sig för självsäker vara den optimala 
lösningen.  
 
